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INTRODUCTION

A cottage industry in administrative law studies the various
mechanisms by which Congress, the President, and the courts exert
control over administrative agencies. Restrictions on the appointment
and removal of personnel,' the specification of requisite procedures
for agency decision making,2 presidential prompt letters, 3 ex ante review of proposed decisions by the Office of Management and Budget
(OMB), 4 legislative vetoes,5 and alterations in funding and jurisdic-

I

See Steven Breker-Cooper, The Appointments Clause and the Removal Power:
Theory
and Siance, 60 TENN. L. REV. 841, 843-44 (1993); Saikrishna Prakash, Removal and Tenure in Office, 92 VA. L. REV. 1779, 1783-85 (2006); see also Anne Joseph O'Connell,

Qualifications (Dec. 14, 2007) (unpublished manuscript, on file with authors) (examining qualification requirements for appointed offices in administrative agencies).
2 For overviews of the delegation literature, see generally DAVID EPSTEIN
& SHARYN
O'HALLoRAN, DELEGATING POWERS: A TRANSACTION COST POLITICS APPROACH TO
POLICY MAKING UNDER SEPARATE POWERS (1999) (developing and testing a theory of

variation in delegation to agencies), and D. RODERICK KiEWIET & MATHEW D. McCuBBINS, THE LOGIC OF DELEGATION: CONGRESSIONAL PARTIES AND THE APPROPRIATIONS

PROCESS (1991) (exploring the history and theory of delegation and delegation
mechanisms). On bureaucratic drift particularly, see Mathew D. McCubbins et al.,
Structure and Process, Politics and Policy: Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies, 75 VA. L. REV. 431, 439 (1989) (discussing how agencies can "shift...
policy outcome [s] away from the legislative intent").
See Nicholas Bagley & Richard L. Revesz, Centralized Oversight of the Regulatory
State, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1260, 1277-80 (2006) (discussing the effect of prompt letters
on agency action); Robert W. Hahn & Robert E, Litan, Counting Regulatory Benefits and
Costs: Lessons for the US and Europe, 8 J. INT'L ECON. L. 473, 476 (2005) (noting the use
of prompt letters to spur regulation in new areas); Robert W. Hahn & Mary Beth
Muething, The GrandExperiment in Regulatory Reporting,55 ADMIN. L. REV. 607, 622, 624
(2003) (describing the use of prompt letters to encourage cost-efficient regulation);
Elena Kagan, PresidentialAdministration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2290-99 (2001) (discussing presidential directives of agency action).
4 See, e.g., Thomas 0. McGarity, Some Thoughts on "Deossifying"the Rulemaking
Process, 41 DuKE L.J. 1385, 1428-36 (1992) (describing incidents of regulatory delay as a
result of OMB review). For a recent discussion, with citations to the literature, see Bagley & Revesz, supra note 3, at 1268-70.
5 See generally Harold H. Bruff & Ernest Gellhorn, Congressional Control
of Administrative Regulation: A Study of Legislative Vetoes, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1369 (1977) (discussing
the effect of the legislative veto on the rulemaking process and the relationships between the branches of government); Michael Herz, The Legislative Veto in Times of Political Reversal: Chadha and the 104th Congress, 14 CONST. COMMENT. 319 (1997) (discussing Chadha and the legislative veto in light of changes in the political composition of
Congress); Robert F. Nagel, The Legislative Veto, the Constitution, and the Courts, 3 CONST.
COMMENT. 61 (1986) (challenging the constitutional basis of Chadha).
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tion 6 are all potential mechanisms for controlling agency behavior.
This Article focuses on a more basic mechanism of control that has
surprisingly gone comparatively unnoticed in the literature on administrative agencies: control of the timing of administrative action.7
Deadlines requiring agencies to commence or complete action by a
specific date are common in the modern administrative state. For example, deadlines are found throughout many modern environmental
statutes. 8 Environmental legislation is hardly an exception in this regard, however. Unfortunately, even basic descriptive statistics about
the frequency and nature of deadlines are lacking, never mind a fully
elaborated theory of regulatory deadlines. This Article provides a
doctrinal, theoretical, and empirical analysis of deadlines in administrative law.
Administrative deadlines are important for several reasons. First,
notwithstanding the range of potential tools Congress uses to control
the bureaucracy, specifying the content of agency rulemakings or adjudications is often difficult, if not impossible, ex ante.'0 A central

See Jacob E. Gersen, Overlapping and UnderlappingJurisdiction in Administrative
Law, 2006 SUP. CT. REV. 201 (2007) (discussing the use of agency jurisdiction as a
mechanism for congressional control of agencies).
7 For examples of the scant research on the impact of deadlines,
see Alden F. Abbott, The Case Against Federal Statutory andJudicialDeadlines: A Cost-Benefit Appraisa 39
ADMIN. L. REV. 171 (1987) [hereinafter Abbott, Cost-Benefit Appraisal]; Alden F. Abbott,
Case Studies on the Costs of Federal Statutory andJudicialDeadlines, 39 ADMIN. L. REV. 467
.(1987) [hereinafter Abbott, Case Studies]; Eric Biber, The Importance of Resource Allocation in Administrative Law: A Case Study ofJudicialReview of Agency Inaction Under the Administrative ProcedureAct, 60 ADMIN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2008) (manuscript at 28-36),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=981941; Gregory L. Ogden, Reducing Administrative Delay: Timeliness Standards,JudicialReview of Agency Procedures, ProceduralReform, and
Legislative Oversight, 4 U. DAYrON. L. REV. 71 (1979); Richard J. Pierce,Jr., JudicialReview of Agency Actions in a Period of DiminishingAgency Resources, 49 ADMIN. L. REV. 61
(1997); and Jason Webb Yackee & Susan Webb Yackee, Is Federal Rulemaking "Ossified"? The Effects on Congressional, Presidential, and Judicial Oversight on the
Agency Policymaking Process (Jan. 3, 2008) (unpublished manuscript, on file with authors). The study of deadlines is related to the study of statutory hammers. See, e.g.,
George A. Bermann, Administrative Delay and Its Control, 30 AM. J. COMP. L. 473 (Supp.
1982); M. Elizabeth Magill, Congressional Control over Agency Rulemaking: The Nutrition
Labeling and EducationAct's HammerProvisions,50 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 149 (1995).
8 See generally Envtl. & Energy Study Inst. & Envil. Law Inst.,
Statutory Deadlines in
Environmental Legislation: Necessary but Need Improvement (Sept. 1985) (unpublished manuscript, on file with authors).
9 The available evidence is almost exclusively focused on environmental policy,
which is important, but far from the only substantive context for deadlines.
10See generallyJacob E. Gersen & Eric A. Posner, Timing Rules and Legal Institutions,
121 HARv. L. REV. 543, 584-88 (2007) (arguing that by regulating the timing of regulation, Congress can affect its content).
6
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premise of the administrative state is that agencies have better information and greater expertise than Congress, thus the need for delegation to agencies."' Because narrow delegations with extensive substantive restrictions would eliminate agency discretion and expertise in
policymaking, it is rare that Congress specifies the actual content or
substance of agency decisions. Absent the ability to regulate content
directly, the most obvious way of controlling agency behavior is to
regulate either the method or the timing of agency decision making.
The former has received exhaustive attention in administrative law.
Structure and process scholars have long emphasized the importance
of procedural requirements in organic statutes, the Administrative
Procedure
Act (APA), 2 administrative common law, 31 and the Consti• 14
tution.
Efforts to regulate the timing .of15 agency decisions have received virtually no attention comparatively.

1 See Philippe Aghion &Jean Tirole, Formal and Real Authority in Organizations,105
J. POL. ECON. 1 (1997) (analyzing authority delegated to agencies as a function of information distribution); Kathleen Bawn, Political Control Versus Expertise: Congressional
Choices About Administrative Procedures, 89 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 62 (1995) (analyzing the
tradeoff between political control and agency expertise); Jonathan Bendor & Adam
Meirowitz, Spatial Models of Delegation, 98 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 293 (2004) (extending
delegation models to consider costs of information gathering); Sean Gailmard, Discretion Rather than Rules: Choice of Instruments To ConstrainBureaucraticPolicy-Making,POL.
ANALYSIS (forthcoming 2008) (comparing "menu laws" (rules) and "action restrictions" (discretion) as tools of control in delegation); Matthew C. Stephenson, Bureaucratic Decision Costs and Endogenous Agency Expertise, 23 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 469 (2007)
(analyzing the impact of decision costs on the development of agency expertise); Steven Callander, A Theory of Policy Expertise (June 11, 2007) (unpublished manuscript,
on file with authors) (predicting delegation of complex matters to agencies expert in
the policymaking process).
12 See generally Mathew D. McCubbins et al., Administrative Procedures as Instruments
of PoliticalControl, 3J.L. ECON. & ORG. 243 (1987); McCubbins et al., supra note 2; Emerson H. Tiller, ControllingPolicy by ControllingProcess: JudicialInfluence on Regulatory Decision Making, 14J.L. ECON. & ORG. 114 (1998).
13 SeeJohn F. Duffy, Administrative Common Law in JudicialReview,
77 TEX.L. REV.
113 (1998); Richard W. Murphy, Hunters for Administrative Common Law, 58 ADMIN. L.
REV. 917 (2006).
14 See, e.g.,
Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administration Afier Chevron, 90 COLUM. L.
REV. 2071, 2111-14 (1990).
15 There is a small literature on the timing of judicial
review and its impact on
administrative law. CompareJERRY L. MASHAW & DAVID L. HARFST, THE STRUGGLE FOR
AUTO SAFETY 69-83 (1990) (lamenting that statutory deadlines hindered rulemaking
by NHTSA in the 1960s and 1970s), and Jerry L. Mashaw, Improving the Environment of
Agency Rulemaking: An Essay on Management, Games, and Accountability, 57 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1994, at 185, 233-38 (criticizing the presumptive availability of
preenforcementjudicial review), with Mark Seidenfeld, Playing Games with the Timing of
Judicial Review: An Evaluation of Proposals To Restrict Pre-Enforcement Review of Agency
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Second, delay is an increasingly prominent fixture in administrative law.16 A recurrent complaint about regulatory policy in the 1980s
and 1990s was that agency decision making was crumbling under burdensome and time-consuming procedural requirements of the APA
and organic statutes, as interpreted by the courts. 7 When agencies
act slowly, or refuse to act at all, 18courts are rarely in a position to dictate specific outcomes. Essentially the only remedy available is to order some agency action within a specified time period-that is, to impose a deadline. Although prior scholarship has occasionally analyzed
the effects of deadlines, 9 the commentary contains virtually no consistent and systematic conclusions based on empirical data about the use
and implications of deadlines in administrative law.' °
Both of these justifications emphasize the use of deadlines to control agencies. Deadlines also illustrate several potential problems for
the internal coherence of administrative law. A running theme in
Rules, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 85 (1997) (arguing that delaying judicial review of agency rules
until an agency brings enforcement proceedings will typically be inefficient).
16 Compare McGarity, supra note 4, at 1387-88 (describing the factors that contribute to the increasingly long rulemaking process), and RichardJ. Pierce, Jr., Seven Ways
To Deossify Agency Rulemaking, 47 ADMIN. L. REV. 59, 65 (1995) (describing rulemaking
as an "extraordinarily lengthy, complicated, and expensive process"), with William S.
Jordan, III, Ossification Revisited: Does Arbitrary and Capricious Review Significantly Interfere
with Agency Ability To Achieve Regulatory Goals Through Informal Rulemaking?, 94 Nw. U. L.
REv. 393, 445 (2000) (arguing that there is no ongoing dilatory process of ossification), and Peter L. Strauss, The Rulemaking Continuum, 41 DUKE L.J. 1463, 1470 (1992)
("[I] nformal rulemaking, generally, is not ossified.").
17 See STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE 57-59 (1993); MASHAW &
HARFST, supra note 15, at 95-103; Thomas 0. McGarity, The Courts and the Ossification of
Rulemaking: A Response to Professor Seidenfeld, 75 TEX. L. REV. 525 (1997); McGarity, supra note 4.
is See generally Biber, supra note 7 (arguing that the potential ramifications of
agency inaction justify judicial review); Eric Biber, Two Sides of the Same Coin: Judicial
Review Under APA Sections 706(1) and 706(2), 26 VA. ENVTL. L.J. (forthcoming 2008),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=981961 (exploring doctrine concerning agency
inaction); Lisa Schultz Bressman, JudicialReview of Agency Inaction: An ArbitrarinessApproach, 79 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1657 (2004) (explaining how political accountability without
judicial oversight encourages agency inaction).
19See, e.g., Abbott, Case Studies, supra note 7; Magill, supra note 7.
20 The few papers of which we are aware focus either on case studies, see, e.g., Abbott, Case Studies, supra note 7, or on a single agency, see, e.g., Magill, supra note 7;
Daniel Carpenter et al., Deadline Effects in Regulatory Drug Review: A Methodological and Empirical Analysis (Mar. 2007) (unpublished manuscript, on file with authors)
(discussing the effects of timing goals imposed on the Food and Drug Administration
by the Prescription Drug User-Fee Act). We recently learned about an independent
empirical study of the duration of rulemaking using data similar to ours that briefly
considers the effect of statutory and judicial deadlines but that focuses on other constraints on agencies. SeeYackee & Yackee, supra note 7.
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administrative
law cases and commentary is the preservation of agency
•• • 21
flexibility.
Courts are typically hesitant to overrule agency decisions
about whether to utilize rulemaking or adjudication to produce policy, whether to utilize formal or informal methods, 3 or whether to
pursue a given enforcement or adjudication.24 The explanations for
these doctrines are many, but one key reason is that agencies themselves (rather than external actors) should determine how best to allocate internal resources.15 Administrative deadlines run counter to
these strands of doctrine because in a world of limited resources,
deadlines reshuffle agency resources from nondeadline actions to
deadline actions. In certain contexts this may be desirable, but it is
also at odds with core themes in the law of the administrative state.
Using newly assembled data,' 6 this Article establishes how often
deadlines are used, against which agencies they are levied, and what
the direct and indirect effects of deadlines are on agency actions. Part
I provides a theoretical framework for analyzing the use and misuse of
deadlines. We focus on the reasons Congress might choose to control
agencies using timing restrictions instead of either substantive constraints or structure and process restrictions.
Part II presents an empirical portrait of administrative deadlines.
We present data on the frequency, nature, and type of deadlines used
to structure agency decisions. Deadlines generally do increase the
pace of agency action, but these effects are modest. Not surprisingly,
deadlines tend to be imposed on more important and significant

21 See Magill, supra note 7, at 186-89 (criticizing the constraints on agency action

imposed by a hammer). For a recent variant on the theme, see Kenneth A. Bamberger, ProvisionalPrecedent: ProtectingFlexibility in AdministrativePolicymaking, 77 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1272, 1274 (2002). See generally Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res.
Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 544 (1978) (discussing the "very basic tenet of administrative law that agencies should be free to fashion their own rules of procedure").
22 See SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 202
(1947) ("In performing its important functions.., an administrative agency must be equipped to act either by general
rule or by individual order."); Kevin M. Stack, The ConstitutionalFoundationsofChenery,
116YALE L.J. 952, 1000-01 (2007).
23 See, e.g., United States v. Fla. E. Coast Ry. Co., 410 U.S.
224, 240 (1973).
24 See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831 (1985)
("This Court has recognized on
several occasions over many years that an agency's decision not to prosecute or enforce, whether through civil or criminal process, is a decision generally committed to
an agency's absolute discretion.").
25 See Biber, supra note
7, at 11-15.
For a more general overview and discussion, see Anne Joseph O'Connell, Political Cycles of Rulemaking: An Empirical Portraitof the Administrative State, 94 VA. L. REv.
(forthcoming June 2008).
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regulatory actions, and the vast bulk of deadlines are issued against
just a handful of administrative agencies. Out of a concern for related
changes in administrative decision making, we also ask whether
agency decisions constrained by deadlines are more likely to be issued
using different procedures than nondeadline decisions. Deadlines are
associated with interim final rulemaking, a deviation from the ordinary mode of notice and comment informal rulemaking.
Part III examines "deadline doctrines": the way that courts address the presence of deadlines in administrative law. When a statutory deadline exists, many courts excuse agency failures to use required procedures; some courts relax the intensiveness of substantive
review. 7 In other contexts, the presence of deadlines makes legal
challenges both more likely to survive threshold questions, allowing
litigation to proceed, and more likely to result in agency defeats.28
Many of these deadline doctrines are in tension with standard themes
in administrative law.
Against this backdrop, Part IV presents some tentative normative
implications. For example, if courts tend to exempt deadline actions
from notice and comment procedures, agencies may intentionally
avoid the costly and time-consuming process of notice and comment
regulation. To the extent that public input and reasoned agency deliberation are valuable, deadlines often undermine those goals. There
are many nuances and countervailing effects discussed more extensively below. The analysis, however, illustrates many of the risks and
benefits from deadlines. In any given policy domain, deadlines can
force desirable agency action, prompting welfare-maximizing or accountability-enhancing action by recalcitrant agencies. Deadlines can,
however, also produce undesirable side effects, such as costly uncertainty and delay in domains where action is important, lower-quality
decisions for deadline-constrained actions, and procedural shifts toward less desirable modes of decision making.
I. THEORY

Deadlines for administrative agencies are generally imposed by
Congress. Theories of congressional choice are legion, and we attempt to remain generally agnostic as between them. Perhaps Congress should be treated as a single institution for decision making; or

27 See infra Part
III.
28

See infra Part III.
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maybe it should be disaggregated, focusing on parties, interests,
committees, or individual legislators. Perhaps congressional action is
best understood from the perspective of public choice. At the margin,
these theories trade off parsimony and accuracy. Although we assume
the interaction between Congress and the bureaucracy is best modeled as a principal-agent problem, there is no question that these
models abstract away from many institutional details. The discussion
that follows is therefore somewhat heterogeneous, drawing on insights
from several models of congressional behavior. In a sense, we are engaged in "off-the-rack" theorizing. Rather than advance a novel theory of congressional choice as correct, we take the most common
theoretical frameworks and apply them to deadlines, progressively relaxing or expanding assumptions. The analysis begins with a simplified problem of institutional design, assuming a unitary Congress,
agency, and court. This assumption is then relaxed, emphasizing how
intra- and inter-institutional heterogeneity affects the use and misuse
of deadlines.
A. InstitutionalDesign
Suppose there are three actors-a principal, an agent, and a
monitor-that correspond imperfectly to Congress, an administrative
agency, and a court, respectively. The design problem for Congress
involves four decisions: (1) delegation versus congressional casework,
(2) substantive discretion, (3) procedural restrictions, and (4) judicial
enforcement. Assume Congress prefers the policy that is implemented to be closer to its preferences (a simple spatial model).29
Suppose the principal seeks to accomplish some arbitrary end, a
new policy problem. Congress must first decide whether to generate
policy internally, using its own resources, or externally, by delegating
to an agency. If Congress delegates, it must select the level of substantive restrictions on the agency. Substantive restrictions might derive
from a narrow statutory mandate, from a low level of discretion (or,
equivalently, a very high level of statutory detail), from the express
prohibition of certain policies, or from a limited grant of jurisdiction
or authority. Assume that agencies have information and expertise
that Congress does not, but that a rational principal would want the
agent to utilize in formulating policy. Congress cannot easily demand

This simple model assumes that Congress cares about the substance of the regulatory system.
29
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that regulatory outcomes coincide with its preferences simply because
Congress prefers the agency to use its expertise in a certain way.
Thus, some degree of substantive discretion almost always accompanies delegation to the bureaucracy.
Given a level of substantive constraint, Congress must select from
a menu of familiar procedural restrictions. An agency's organic statute might require that specific decision-making procedures be utilized. Alternatively, the organic statute might trigger requirements of
the APA, mandating, for certain types of decisions, formal rulemaking,31 formal adjudication,32 or informal notice and comment rulemaking. The statute might require that certain substantive policy
goals be considered prior to a final decision, as the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) does.33 A statute might regulate the
transparency of agency decisions, as do sunshine statutes. 34 Or the
organic statute might mandate that specifically identified actors within
the bureaucracy consider the evidence and make ultimate policy decisions. In addition, statutes may restrict who can serve in these decision-making positions. 36 It is now conventional wisdom that restrictions on the process by which agencies make decisions constitute a
powerful tool for affecting policy and limiting bureaucratic drift.

M See, e.g., National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (2000).
31 See United States v. Fla. E. Coast Ry. Co., 410 U.S. 224, 241 (1973).
32 Compare City of W. Chi. v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Comm'n, 701 F.2d

632, 641
(7th Cir. 1983) (permitting informal adjudication), with Union of Concerned Scientists v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 735 F.2d 1437, 1444 n.12 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
(suggesting that the statute required formal adjudication).
33 See 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2) (C) (2000) (requiring a detailed statement considering
the environmental impact of major federal actions); see also Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power
Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 435 U.S. 519, 551 (1978) (delineating the scope of
the statutory requirement to consider alternatives to proposed actions). See generally
Celia Campbell-Mohn &John S. Applegate, Learningfrom NEPA: New Guidelinesfor Responsible Risk Legislation, 23 HARv. ENVTL. L. REv. 93 (1999) (describing the scope of
NEPA's requirements).
" See Elizabeth Garrett & Adrian Vermeule, Transparency in the U.S.
Budget Process,
in FISCAL CHALLENGES: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACH TO BUDGET POLICY 68, 72
(Elizabeth Garrett et al. eds., 2008) (analyzing the impact of sunshine statutes on the
budget process); Anne Joseph O'Connell, The Architecture of Smart Intelligence: Structuring and OverseeingAgencies in the Post-9/11 World, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1655, 1717-27 (2006)
(analyzing the costs and benefits of transparency for democratic legitimacy and agency
effectiveness).
35 See, e.g., Fla. E. Coast Ry., 410 U.S. at 230-32
(describing authority granted to the
Interstate Commerce Commission to regulate freight car rates).
36 See O'Connell, supra note 1, at 14-22.
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Within the structure and process literature, however, temporal restric37
tions have received far less attention .
Congress must also decide whether to make such provisions judicially enforceable, which generates another set of agency problems.3
Even ifjudges are faithful agents of Congress39 (a claim of dubious accuracy), there is still a nontrivial risk ofjudicial error such thatjudges
may strike down agency actions that Congress would prefer be upheld
and uphold actions Congress would prefer be struck down. We assume that the risk of error is higher for the enforcement of substantive limitations on agencies (such as jurisdictional determinations)
than for temporal restrictions on agencies (such as deadlines). 0 The
timing of agency action will generally be easier to evaluate (against a
statutory deadline) than the content of a rule (against substantive
statutory standards).
This is true for courts, but it is true for Congress as well. There is
a tradeoff between the temporal dimension and the substantive dimension of policy. To illustrate, suppose Congress has a temporal
preference as well as a substantive preference. It is easier to specify
and monitor compliance for the temporal preference (say with a
quick deadline), but doing so may produce shirking or reductions in
quality along the substantive dimension. Congressional choice about
whether to regulate substance, timing, or procedure depends in part
on the costs of specifying the rule ex ante and monitoring agency
compliance along each dimension ex post.
Consider a conservative Congress in favor of deregulation and a
pro-regulation agency. When Congress enacts a deregulatory statute,
the agency can shirk in one of two ways. It can pass new regulations
that have the appearance of deregulating, but not the effect. Alterna-

37 But see EPSTEIN & O'HALLORAN, supra note 2, at 14-33 (arguing that the politics
of temporal delay insulate bureaucrats from external, inexpert control).
38 See Matthew C. Stephenson, Legislative Allocation of Delegated Power: Uncertainty,
Risk, and the Choice Between Agencies and Courts, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1036 (2006) (comparing the consequences of delegating statutory interpretation authority to agencies
rather than courts).
39 See, e.g., William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The IndependentJudiciary in
an
Interest-Group Perspective, 18J.L. & ECON. 875 (1975) (exploring whether independent
judges undermine legislative policy choices).
See Gersen & Posner, supra note 10, at 579-82 (arguing that courts have more
difficulty with substantive review than with the enforcement of timing rules because of
doctrine requiring judges to "determine whether a state interest is 'compelling
enough' or whether a statute is 'related enough,' for example, to interstate commerce").
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tively, the agency can delay deregulation. An agency might shirk either because of laziness or because of preference divergence, but in
either case it will generally be more difficult for Congress to distinguish "good delay" from "bad delay" than "good regulation" from
"bad regulation." Delay may be a better way of shirking than producing low-quality regulations. If so, statutory deadlines affect the vehicle
that agencies use to shirk, shifting shirking from harder-to-monitor to
easier-to-monitor behavior.
This direct effect is almost an unqualified good from the principal's perspective; however, deadlines can produce other, negative side
effects. Suppose Congress imposes extensive procedural requirements and a quick deadline. A straightforward potential result is to
41
decrease the quality of agency deliberations and decisions. If a task
that normally takes six hours to finish must be completed in one hour,
a natural inference is that the quality of the output will be sacrificed.
Indeed, emerging empirical evidence suggests precisely this conclusion in the context of certain Food and Drug Administration (FDA)
42
decisions under deadline constraints.
If agencies must attempt to
satisfy extensive procedural requirements in an unrealistic timeframe,
the quality of agency decisions will likely fall, all else being equal. 3
These deadline dynamics also have implications for agency actions
not constrained by deadlines. In addition to the direct effect on the
timing and quality of agency action, deadlines will often change the
internal allocation of resources. 44 If agencies allocate resources according to the temporal priority of different programs, a close deadline will draw resources from other policy areas; a far-off deadline will
allocate resources to other areas in the interim. If there is a correla-

41 See Frank B. Cross, Pragmatic Pathologies of JudicialReview of Administrative
Rulemaking, 78 N.C. L. REV. 1013, 1047 (2000) (describing the "sham regulations" resulting
from judicial intervention in the Environmental Protection Agency's regulation of radionuclides); McGarity, supra note 4, at 1456 ("[L]imited agency resources may be expended in litigation over deadlines rather than in writing regulations."). It is possible,
however, that deadlines make it easier for an agency to act, functioning perhaps as a
necessary credible commitment device. Cf O'Connell, supra note 26, at 17 n.82 (explaining that the transition period between an end-of-term election and a new President's inauguration can be a "needed credible commitment device" for agencies to
promulgate rules).
42 Carpenter et al., supra note
20, at 21.
43 See id.
44 Cf Biber, supra note 7 (describing judicial review of agency choices
between

deadlines and resource allocation); Pierce, supra note 7, at 77-84 (discussing the difficulties that agencies face when Congress confuses their lack of resources with unproductiveness and imposes temporal restrictions).
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tion between timing and quality, the use of deadlines in one policy
area may affect the quality of decisions in others. In a world of limited
resources, rational agencies will be forced to allocate time and energy
away from agency programs without deadlines and toward programs
with deadlines.
Because of the link between timing rules and substance, there is
also a danger that deadlines can allow some legislators to make an end
run around existing procedural requirements. For example, the legislative rule doctrine in administrative law requires notice and comment
rulemaking for the promulgation of certain types of agency decisions. 45 For legislators seeking to avoid the lengthy process of informal rulemaking, but who (for one reason or another) prefer not to
directly exempt the agency action from notice and comment requirements, 46 imposing a deadline might obviate those requirements
indirectly, 47 at least so long as courts exempt these decisions from
such requirements because of the deadline.
B. Extensions
The common assumption that Congress is a unitary actor corresponds poorly to reality. There is heterogeneity both within a given
Congress, as partisan and ideological differences abound, and across
Congresses over time, as policy views shift and controlling majorities
shift from Democrat to Republican or vice versa. Within a given Congress, partisanship is a main-if not dominant-determinant of legislative behavior. 48 Legislators from different states and districts should,
by design, represent different public and private interest groups. The
median preferences of the House of Representatives are typically
thought to differ significantly from the median preferences of the

The importance of distinguishing legislative and nonlegislative rules has been
the subject of scholarly debate. See, e.g., William Funk, Legislating for Nonlegislative
Rules, 56 ADMIN. L. REV. 1023 (2004); William Funk, When Is a "Rule" a Regulation?
Marking a Clear Line Between Nonlegislative Rules and Legislative Rules, 54 ADMIN. L. REV.
659 (2002);John F. Manning, Nonlegislative Rules, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 893, 914-27
(2004); see also Michael Asimow, Public Participationin the Adoption of Interpretive Rules
and Policy Statements, 75 MICH. L. REV. 520, 542 (1977);Jacob E. Gersen, Legislative Rules
Revisited, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 1705 (2007); Kevin W. Saunders, Interpretative Rules with
LegislativeEffect: An Analysis and a Proposalfor PublicParticipation,1986 DUKE L.J. 346, 352.
45

46
47
48

See infra note 128.
See infra Part Ill.

See generally JOHN H. ALDRICH, WHY PARTIES?

TION OF POLITICAL PARTIES IN AMERICA (1995).

THE ORIGIN AND TRANSFORMA-
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Senate. 9 Modeling congressional decision making, then, might require an explicit focus on coalitional bargaining within the legislature.
Just as there will be bargaining about the substantive requirements
of the bill, there will also be bargaining over procedural provisions,
such as whether the statute will contain a sunset clause, a deadline for
agency action, or other reporting and deliberation requirements.
Sometimes legislators will be indifferent between substance and procedure: legislators should be willing to trade off gains along one of
these dimensions for gains along another. If the imposition of deadlines on agencies produces a net reduction in agency effectiveness,
then a skeptical legislator may be willing to vote for a stronger substantive bill that also includes an unrealistic deadline. Deadlines
should be as much a point of legislative bargaining as other statutory
provisions. Statutory deadlines affect the timing of the distribution of
benefits. Private or public actors with varying time preferences may
prefer to solidify the timing of a regulatory benefit, even at the cost of
a higher substantive guarantee.
More importantly, for an enacting legislative coalition, there are
always at least two threats to a new statute. The first is bureaucratic
drift-the risk that agencies implementing the statute will alter it.
There is also a corresponding threat of legislative drift. A future legislature might
amend or repeal the statute once control of the legislaS 50
ture shifts. Congressional preferences also vary over time as control
of the legislature shifts or policy views change. Decisions about the
content of substantive and procedural restrictions must reflect a balance between these two types of threats.

49 Cf Keith Krehbiel, Are Congressional Committees Composed of Preference
Outliers?, 84

AM. POL. SCI. REV. 149, 155 (1990) (finding considerable ideological variation in congressional committees); John Londregan & James M. Snyder, Jr., ComparingCommittee
and FloorPreferences, 19 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 233, 262 (1994) (finding that at least one-third
of House committees are preference outliers).
50 See Murray J. Horn & Kenneth A. Shepsle, Commentary on "Administrative
Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies": Administrative Process and Organizational
Form as Legislative Responses to Agency Costs, 75 VA. L. REv. 499, 503-04 (1989) (addressing the problems of legislative drift and how legislatures can impose costs and rules to
influence future coalitions); Kenneth A. Shepsle, BureaucraticDrift, CoalitionalDrift, and
Time Consistency: A Comment on Macey, 8J.L. ECON. & ORG. 111, 116 (1992) (supporting
a judicial role in reducing legislative drift); see alsoJ.R. DeShazo &Jody Freeman, The
Congressional Competition To Control Delegated Power, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1443, 1457-59
(2003) (arguing that scholars too often forget about legislative drift and that agencies
rarely respond to a "consistent voice" in Congress); O'Connell, supra note 26, at 52-53
(presenting empirical evidence of the unique demands placed on agencies as a result
of legislative drift).
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The bureaucratic drift versus legislative drift tradeoff is a standard
and general point. Deadlines, however, can balance these risks in an
innovative way. An agency could be required to issue its rule during
the current congressional session. In that case, the deadline guards
against bureaucratic drift by ensuring that the enacting Congress gets
to see (and possibly object to) the final regulation. In this way, the
timing rule affects monitoring: deadlines allow legislators to respond
to criticism and complaints by private parties. 5'
Short statutory deadlines can also mitigate the risk of legislative
drift by ensuring that agency action is implemented during the current Congress. The conventional wisdom is that Congress must
choose between giving up legislative control, which creates a risk of
bureaucratic drift, or maintaining long-term legislative control, which
creates a risk of legislative drift. This is not necessarily true of temporal restrictions. Unlike other tools that tend to control one type of
drift at the expense of another, statutory deadlines have the potential
tojointly manage both.52
While this is a real effect in theory, most deadlines appear to be
set in one Congress but impose obligations during a future Congress.
These latter deadlines may serve more traditional political ends. Suppose the deadline comes due before the next presidential election.
So long as a congressional election takes place during the deadline
time period, the risk of legislative drift increases and the role of parties in managing that risk grows. Consider a time period of frequent
political turnover (high instability) during which Congress enacts legislation authorizing the regulation of some facet of the financial services industry. Setting a deadline for the issuance of new Securities
and Exchange Commission regulations prior to the next congres51
sional election provides more protection for the regulatory regime.
The future legislature can always repeal or alter the program, but
once regulations have been implemented, some form of status quo

" See Mathew D. McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz, CongressionalOversight Overlooked:
PolicePatrols Versus Fire Alarms, 28 AM.J. POL. SCI. 165, 173-76 (1984).
52 To the extent that deadlines are set and terminate during the same Congress,
the timeframe for agency action is very short. Deadlines of this sort, say six to fourteen
months, are possible. However, short deadlines may cause courts to sympathize with
agency arguments that there is good cause to avoid notice and comment procedures.
The short deadline provides political benefits, but also comes with some procedural
costs. In part, oversight hearings and more careful monitoring of agency action can
compensate for these costs.
3 Cf O'Connell, supra note 26, at 53-56 (presenting the implications
of midnight
and crack-of-dawn congressional action).
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bias may make it marginally harder to eliminate them-especially during periods of divided government.5 Similarly, within the bureaucracy, certain agencies are perceived to be friendly to business or to labor, in favor of more regulation or laissez-faire. If the use of deadlines
is political, then it should vary across agencies and legislatures. Democratic legislatures should use deadlines more often to constrain
pro-business agencies; Republican legislatures should use deadlines to
control pro-labor or pro-environment agencies.
The willingness ofjudges to enforce deadlines aggressively will have
an obvious impact on the willingness of legislators to rely on deadlines.
To the extent that statutory deadlines require judicial enforcement,
the degree of heterogeneity within the judiciary or judicial doctrine
over time will make deadlines more or less attractive to legislators.
In sum, deadlines are an important element of the legislative
toolkit, whose use and misuse implicate core problems of institutional
design. The optimal use of deadlines by Congress will depend on how
courts treat deadlines, how agencies respond to judicial doctrines, and
the underlying political dynamics within and across the branches of
government. This Part has emphasized the range of relevant variables
that constrain congressional choice about deadlines. Ultimately,
however, to say that deadlines are used too much or too little, in the
right circumstances or the wrong ones, a systematic empirical analysis
is required.
II. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS

Although a nascent literature studies the use of deadlines in applied contexts,5' there is little systematic evidence on the prevalence
and implications of administrative deadlines for agency rulemaking. 56
How frequently are deadlines imposed on agencies? Which agencies
54 See GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 5-7
(1982).

55 See, e.g., Abbott, Case Studies, supra note 7 (using case studies of eleven federal

agencies to show the ineffectiveness of administrative deadlines); cf Amy Whritenour
Ando, Waiting To Be Protected Under the Endangered Species Act: The Political Economy of
Regulatoiy Delay, 42 J.L. & ECON. 29 (1999) (finding that public pressure plays a major

role in the length of agency delays); Daniel P. Carpenter, Groups, the Media, Agency
Waiting Costs, and FDA DrugApproval, 46 AM. J. POL. Sc. 490 (2002) (analyzing the effect of political influence on FDA delays); Mary K. Olson, ManagingDelegation in the
FDA: Reducing Delay in New-Drug Review, 29J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 397 (2004) (examining whether budgetary constraints or revised procedures were responsible for the
increased speed of new-drug review by the FDA).
This Article is limited to agency rulemaking. Agencies also face deadlines for
adjudications, policy statements, reports, and other actions.
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are most likely to be constrained by deadlines? A preliminary but extremely important question is whether deadlines matter at all. Do
deadlines produce faster agency decisions? If so, do deadlines change
other aspects of the administrative process by shifting agency decision
making away from certain conventional procedures like notice and
comment and toward less time-consuming mechanisms? Although
the answers to these questions are necessarily tentative, our analysis
suggests that there are critical tradeoffs between the timing of agency
action, the procedures
used to make agency decisions, and the quality
57
policy.
of regulatory

57 The data are drawn from agency semiannual reports from April
1983 to Octo-

ber 2003 in the Unified Agenda of FederalRegulatory and DeregulatoryActions, which is published in the Federal Register. For a detailed description of the data and their advantages and limitations, see O'Connell, supra note 26, at 22-25 & nn.99-108. The Unified
Agenda reports represent a successive picture of agency activity; therefore, there is considerable overlap among the semiannual reports. In other words, a rule may appear
multiple times in various editions of the Unfied Agenda: the first appearance may reflect the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM), the second may indicate the end of
the comment period, and the third may describe the final promulgation of the rule.
Each appearance typically includes all previously disclosed information. Thus, it is
critical to remove duplicate entries in the analysis so that particular rulemaking actions, such as an NPRM, are counted only once. For most of the analysis presented
here, where there are multiple entries using the same Regulation Identifier Number
(RIN) (a unique identifier), only the most recent Unified Agenda report entry was retained for each RIN. This means, however, that if an earlier entry for a RIN contained
information on a deadline but a later entry for that same RIN did not, that deadline
information would not be captured in the data. For some of the analysis (e.g., Tables
1-2 and Figures 1-2), if there was no deadline reported, the most recent Unified Agenda
entry was retained for each RIN; if there was a deadline reported, however, the most
recent of all Unfied Agenda entries with the same RIN and deadline information (deadline type, deadline stage, and deadline date) was retained. For this subset of the analysis, deadline information therefore is not lost. In order to pair deadline information
with other attributes of regulatory actions, the more crude duplication rule (i.e., the
deletion of all previous entries of the same RIN) had to be applied. Thus, for most of
the analysis (other than Tables 1-2 and Figures 1-2), we are undercounting the presence of deadlines. Agencies did not report on deadlines until the 1988 Unified Agenda.
The information reported starting in 1988, however, contains some data on deadlines
prior to 1988.
Legislative and judicial deadlines are primarily classified in the data files under
one of three categories: commencement of action, completion of action, and other.
The "commencement" category usually refers to deadlines for the issuance of NPRMs.
The "completion" category includes mandates for completed rules (including interim
final rules) and other final agency actions (including announcements). The "other"
category includes such items as Advance Notices of Proposed Rulemaking.
In addition to classifying the type of deadline, agencies often also report the date
of the deadline. Some agencies, however, do not provide dates for some of the deadlines they report. The Department of Commerce, for example, lists a significant number of deadlines, but does not report dates for many of those deadlines.
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A. Descriptive Overview
1. Deadlines over Time

Table 1 presents the number of statutory, judicial, and total deadlines by year. 58 The use of deadlines was highest in the early 1990s,
with 296 in 1991 and 298 in 1992, and in 2000, with 317. After the
early 1990s, the use of deadlines appears to fall off somewhat. In 1998
and 1999 there were only 194 and 151 deadlines due, respectively, but
the number increased again by 2000. While the existence of deadlines varied significantly from year to year, the use of deadlines did
not seem to be uniformly increasing or decreasing.
The second thing to note from Table 1 is the relative composition
of deadlines. In any given year, most of the deadlines faced by agencies were statutory rather than judicial deadlines (thus the emphasis
on congressional choice in Part I). Figure 1 presents a graph of deadlines over time, decomposing the total deadlines into statutory and
judicial deadlines. In most years, statutory deadlines constituted the
vast bulk of deadlines imposed on agencies, hovering between 70%
and 95%. Interestingly, however, there were exceptions. For example, judicial deadlines constituted over 40% of all deadlines imposed
in 1998, 2001, and 2003, suggesting that judicially imposed deadlines,
though less common than statutory deadlines, are a real and important conceptual category.
2. Deadlines by Agency
Table 2 disaggregates deadlines by the agency on which they were
imposed. Most agencies reported few statutory or judicial deadlines
during the covered time period. However, a handful of agencies
listed more than 100 deadlines during this relatively brief period. The
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) faced over 1000 deadlines,
more than any other agency. In addition, the Department of Commerce confronted over 950 deadlines, the Department of Interior received nearly 500 deadlines, and the Department of Transportation
(DOT) and the Department of Agriculture (USDA) each received
more than 350 deadlines. The Department of Health and Human
Services (HHS) faced 335 deadlines in aggregate.

58 The Table contains deadline counts where the agencies reported specific
dates

(including month, day, and year). Because agencies often report deadlines without
specific dates, these numbers do not reflect the full scope of actual deadlines.
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For most agencies, deadlines are imposed by Congress rather than
courts. There are, however, a few obvious outliers. The Department
of Interior, for example, reported 209 judicial deadlines and 279
statutory deadlines, suggesting an ongoing dispute with the courts.
The only other agency with a significant number ofjudicially imposed
deadlines is the EPA. The EPA's Air and Radiation division listed 309
deadlines from the courts, and its Water division submitted information on 243 deadlines from the courts. Most of these deadlines presumably derive from the almost perpetual litigation over rules promulgated pursuant to the Clean Air Act and Clean Water Act. The
EPA's Solid Waste and Emergency Response division reported 169judicial deadlines. Only this division and the Water division listed more
judicial deadlines than statutory deadlines.
Figure 2 traces the number of statutory deadlines reported for
four major agencies from 1988 to 2003: the USDA, EPA, HHS, and
DOT. A few points are noteworthy. First, there are two evident spikes
in the plot. One affected three, possibly four, agencies in the late
1980s and early 1990s, including the USDA, EPA, DOT, and arguably
the HHS (though the increase in deadlines is lower for HHS than the
other three agencies). Given the relatively steady use of deadlines
throughout the other years in the sample for all agencies (except the
EPA), the graph suggests an uptick in the use of deadlines at or
around the late 1980s and early 1990s. The other spike occurred
around the year 2000, but only for the EPA. If one were to draw a regression line through these data points, it would be very slightly downward sloping, but virtually flat. For single agencies, the line would be
more sharply downward sloping for the DOT and USDA. Figure 2 is
useful as an initial overview, but it also may mask a good deal of potential variation. For example, even if the use of deadlines has not
changed over time, rules with deadlines might still differ from nondeadline rules, or agency responses to deadlines could change over
time, even if aggregate congressional usage did not.
3. Overlap of Statutory and Judicial Deadlines
Table 2 suggests that most agencies that are subject to deadlines
are subject to statutory deadlines. If judges are merely enforcing
statutorily specified deadlines as opposed to creating a different set of
obligations, then it makes sense to focus most of our conceptual attention on statutory deadlines, albeit with an emphasis on judges as potential enforcers. A basic way to explore this question is to ask
whether the presence of a statutory deadline usually implies the pres-
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ence of a judicial deadline and vice versa. A low correlation between
statutory and judicial deadlines would mean that judges are rarely imposing judicial deadlines in the absence of an existing statutory deadline. As Table 3 indicates, there is a positive and statistically significant correlation between statutory and judicial deadlines, but the
degree of correlation is fairly modest. 9
Table 4 presents data on deadline overlap categorically. More
than 90% of all unique regulatory actions are not associated with a
deadline. Nearly 8% are associated with only statutory deadlines;
about 1% are associated with only judicial deadlines; and fewer than
0.25% are associated with bothjudicial and statutory deadlines. 6°
4. Importance of Deadline Actions
Evaluating the practical importance of deadlines necessitates
knowing about the deadlines' targets. If deadlines are not only rare,
but also regulate trivial agency actions, then perhaps the topic is theoretically intriguing, but not especially important practically.
Table 5 categorizes regulatory actions according to whether or not
they are "significant."61 Of those actions accompanied by any deadline (statutory, judicial, or both), about 34% are significant regulatory
actions, compared to about 20% of actions with no deadline. Although most agency actions are not significant actions, deadline actions are much more likely to be significant regulatory actions than

59 We use three common tests: (1) Pearson correlation with a one-tailed
test for
statistical significance, (2) Kendall's tau B, and (3) Spearman's rho. The Pearson statistic is technically inappropriate, given its assumption of normality in the underlying
distribution, but we nonetheless report it, as it is a commonly reported-and misreported--statistic.
60 To see why this could produce a positive correlation coefficient, note that
the
absence of a statutory deadline is generally associated with the absence of a judicial
deadline. Thus, the two variables are positively correlated despite the fact that only
0.25% of unique RINs are associated with both judicial and statutory deadlines.
61 The law defines "significant," or "major," rules as those that have
at least a $100
million annual effect on the economy, or otherwise "adversely affect [it] in a material
way." Exec. Order No. 12,866, § 3(f), 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735, 51,738 (Sept. 30, 1993),
amended by Exec. Order No. 13,422, 72 Fed. Reg. 2763 (Jan. 18, 2007). In the database
created from the Unified Agenda reports, actions were deemed significant if Priority
Code = 10 (Economically Significant) or 20 (Otherwise Significant), or if Major = Yes.
See O'Connell, supra note 26, at 2 n.8, 62. For this analysis, we looked at reports from
April 1995 to October 2003 because information on significance was not routinely reported until 1995.
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62

are nondeadline actions. Another basic way to make this point is in
Table 6, which contains simple correlations between deadlines and
significant regulatory actions. All three measures produce identical
and statistically significant correlation coefficients. Deadlines more
often accompany significant regulatory actions than more mundane
agency decisions.
Congress is also more likely to use deadlines to constrain regulatory actions that impinge on core values of democratic institutions.
Table 7 contains simple correlations between underlying statutory or
regulatory characteristics and the presence of an administrative deadline. 63 Each association in Table 7 is positive; deadlines are more
likely to be associated with each of the regulatory category types. For
example, deadlines are more likely when the regulatory policy implicates state, local, federal, or tribal governmental concerns, or unfunded mandates. The simple story is that when Congress uses a
deadline, it is usually to constrain agency actions that have a broad effect on powerfully situated political interests.
B. Changes in Agency Process
The theoretical discussion emphasized that deadlines may change
the agency decision-making process, shifting agency resources and
perhaps even reducing regulatory quality. To evaluate these theoretical propositions, this Section considers the effects of deadlines on the
procedures used to issue policy, the extent of public participation,
and the duration of agency decisions. Deadlines alter agency behavior
on all three fronts.

62

This difference in means is significant in an independent samples t-test (RINs

with any deadline (with and without an actual date) versus RINs with no deadline) at
p < 0.0001. The test does not assume equal variances between the two samples, as that
assumption is rejected by Levene's Test for Equality of Variances with F= 504.922
(p< 0.0001).
63 All of the listed associations are statistically significant (p < 0.001), and although
we use several different estimators to calculate the correlations, the value never varies
across estimates. Agencies did not report on deadlines in the Unified Agenda until
1988. To compare the particular attributes of regulatory actions with the presence of
deadlines, we had to restrict ourselves to data from Unified Agenda reports after both
began to be reported, which was 1988 for government characteristics and 1995 for unfunded mandates.
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1. Alternative Procedures
"Interim final rules" and "direct final rules" are two large categories of legally binding rules that are issued without prior comment.6
One important potential change in agency process would be less reliance on standard notice and comment rulemaking procedures. Table 8
presents a breakdown of deadline and nondeadline
actions and the
• 65
use of interim and direct final rulemaking. For purposes of discussion, focus on the columns labeled "Any Deadline" and "No Deadline." Of the agency actions accompanied by any deadline, slightly
over 12% issued interim final rules, compared to under 8% of actions
not accompanied by a deadline.
As the bottom half of Table 8 illustrates, direct final rulemaking is
used less often and is significantly less likely to be used for deadline
actions. In part, this is probably because direct final rules are supposed to be used for nonsignificant actions and deadlines tend to get
placed on significant regulatory actions. Although the actual percentages are extremely small-all less than 1%-the proportion of actions
without a deadline for which direct final rules were issued (0.77% of
Regulation Identifier Numbers (RINs)) is more than three times the
proportion of actions with a deadline for which direct final rules were
issued (0.21% of RINs). 67 The simple correlation between deadlines

64 "Direct final rules" become effective some time after publication in the Federal

Register unless the agency receives "adverse" comments. "Interim final rules" take effect
immediately upon publication but the agencies receive comments on them after the
fact. Interim final rules are supposed to be used when the agency has good cause to
enact rules immediately, such as in emergency situations. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/GGD-98-126, FEDERAL RULEMAKING: AGENCIES OFTEN PUBLISHED FINAL
ACTIONS WITHOUT PROPOSED RULES 6-7 (1998); see also Michael Asimow, Public Participation in the Adoption of Temporary Tax Regulations, 44 TAX LAW. 343, 343-44 (1991) (discussing the use of interim final rules in the Treasury Department); Lars Noah, Doubts
About Direct Final Rulemaking, 51 ADMIN. L. REv. 401, 401-02 (1999) (investigating the
tendency to evade procedural requirements through direct final rulemaking).
65 On direct final rules, see Ronald M. Levin, Direct Final Rulemaking,
64 GEO.
WASH. L. REv. 1 (1995) (advocating the broad use of direct final rules in noncontroversial situations).
66 A t-test of the difference in means of interim final
rules in the two samples
(RINs with any deadline (with and without an actual date) and RJNs with no deadline)
is significant at p< 0.0001. The test does not assume equal variances between the two
samples, as that assumption is rejected by Levene's Test for Equality of Variances with
F= 293.420 (p< 0.0001).
67 The difference is significant. A t-test of the difference
in means of direct final
rules in the two samples (RINs with any deadline (with and without an actual date) and
RINs with no deadline) is significant at p< 0.0001. The test does not assume equal
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and interim final rules is positive and statistically significant, and the
simple correlation between deadlines and direct final rules is negative
and statistically significant, as Table 9 shows. By displacing rules from
the normal notice and comment process, deadlines seem to change
agency process, at least
S
68 for some portion of the underlying distribution of agency actions.
2. Extent of Public Participation
Different procedures do not necessarily mean lower-quality decisions. Deadlines may, however, also reduce traditional commenting
69
and public participation in agency decision making.
Somewhat
counterintuitively, deadlines are actually associated with a higher
number of comment periods, as Table 10 illustrates. 70 Recall, however, that deadlines are more often associated with significant actions,
and significant actions tend to have more extensive comment periods
than nonsignificant actions.7 ' The real question is whether, within the
class of significant regulatory actions, deadlines generate more or
fewer opportunities for public participation. Among significant actions, deadline actions are issued with significantly fewer comment periods. 72 Within the relevant subset, deadlines produce fewer chances

variances between the two samples, as that assumption is rejected by Levene's Test for
Equality of Variances with F= 48.105 (p < 0.0001).
68 This is not to say that all interim or direct final rules are of low quality. If, however, notice and comment is taken as the appropriate baseline, downward procedural
deviations from that norm will be more likely to produce errors.
See generally Mariano-Florentino Cullar, Rethinking Regulatory Democracy,
57
ADMIN. L. REv. 411 (2005) (emphasizing the importance of allowing for full public
comment before issuing rules).
70 The two variables are significantly correlated, with a
simple correlation coefficient between 0.043 and 0.050 (depending on the estimator). See infra Table 10. The
.comments" variable's value increases by one for a new comment period, a reopened
comment period, or an extended comment period.
71 See supra Part
II.A.4.
72 The data contain only the number of comment
periods, not the number of
comments. The mean number of comment periods for all significant regulatory actions with at least one deadline is 0.408, and the mean number of comment periods
for significant regulatory actions without a deadline is 0.410; the difference is not statistically significant. However, there is a much larger, statistically significant difference
if we restrict the data to significant regulatory actions with an NPRM with an actual
date. In that case, the mean number of comment periods for significant actions with
at least one deadline is 0.625, and the mean number of comment periods for such actions without a deadline is 0.815. Not every significant action actually has a comment
period; for instance, an agency could issue a significant regulation as an interim final
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for public input and less agency process, two variables typically associated with higher-quality and more legitimate decisions. At a minimum, deadlines likely involve a tradeoff between the pace of agency
action and the extent of public participation in the policymaking
process.
3. Duration of Agency Actions
Because deadlines are a proposed solution to the problem of
agency delay, an important question is whether deadlines actually
speed up decisions. If deadlines do not change the timing of agency
decisions, then the range of potential negative side effects is all the
more worrisome.
Table 11 provides basic correlations of duration with regulatory
significance and deadlines.74
Significant regulatory actions take
longer to complete and deadline actions finish more quickly than
nondeadline actions. Expressed differently, in this same subset of
data, the average duration for rulemakings that do not have any deadline reported is 528 days (95% confidence interval ranges from 511 to
546 days). By contrast, the average duration for rulemakings that
have a deadline is 427 days (95% confidence interval ranges from 396
7.5
to 459).
Table 12 presents disaggregated results for four agencies facing a
considerable number of deadlines. Deadlines shorten duration for all
these agencies, but in many cases the effect is relatively modest. The

rule with no previous comment periods. Also, agencies may not report comment periods to the Unified Agenda.
73A

t-test of the difference in means of comment periods in the two samples

(RINs with any deadline (with and without an actual date) and RINs with no deadline)
is significant at p < 0.0001. The test does not assume equal variances between the two
samples, as that assumption is rejected by Levene's Test for Equality of Variances with
F= 196.241 (p< 0.0001).
74 As an indicator of duration, we compute the time between the initial NPRM
and
a traditional final rule, final action, interim final rule, or direct final rule for RINs reporting such actions with actual dates. In the database created from the Unifed Agenda
reports, actions were counted as a final rule or final action if the rulemaking action
listed in the Timetable field was coded as 330 (Final Rule) or 600 (Final Action), respectively; actions were counted as an interim final rule or a direct final rule if the
rulemaking action listed in the Timetable field was coded as 50 (Interim Final Rule) or
325 (Direct Final Rule), respectively. See O'Connell, supra note 26, at 62. For this
analysis, we looked only at reports to the Unified Agenda from April 1995 to October
2003 and retained RINs only if they had an NPRM with an actual date reported. Agencies did not report on the significance of actions, a key explanatory variable, until 1995.
75 The confidence intervals around these means do
not overlap.
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average duration of USDA nondeadline actions is 401 days, versus 376
days for deadline actions. EPA nondeadline actions take an average of
685 days, versus 611 days for deadline actions. The difference for
DOT is somewhat larger-586 days with no deadlines versus 440 days
with deadlines. For HHS, deadlines seem to have a very large effect.
HHS deadline actions are completed in an average of 445 days, while
nondeadline actions take an average of 817 days. Although preliminary, these data suggest that deadlines reduce the duration of HHS
action by more than 40%, but for many other agencies, deadlines reduce average length of action only modestly.
These results are suggestive, but to say anything rigorous about
differential duration, multivariate analysis is needed. We therefore
estimate two competing risks Cox Proportional Hazard (CPH) models, where the possible outcomes are rule completion and rule withdrawal. 76 Duration or hazard models estimate the hazard rate-here,
the instantaneous rate at which an agency action ends after time t,
given that the agency action has been ongoing until t." The basic
question here is simply whether deadlines increase the hazard rate, or,
put differently, shorten the duration of agency actions.7 8 Positive
76 For this analysis, we looked at reports to the Unifed Agenda from April
1995 to

October 2003, and from April 1988 to October 2003, and retained RINs only if they
had an NPRM with an actual date reported. Agencies did not report on the significance of actions, a key explanatory variable, until 1995, so significance of the regulatory action can be included as a covariate in only the first set of data. Both sets of data
contain information about regulatory actions that occurred in earlier years, including
some actions from many years earlier. It is conceivable that these much earlier observations could produce selection bias in our regression results because they represent
only a small portion of regulatory actions in those years. We ran the various regression
models on only the more recent regulatory actions (after 1990, 1993, and 1995) and
obtained similar results. Thus, for the analysis described here, we retained all the observations obtained from the two subsets of reports, irrespective of the dates of the
regulatory actions. Independent from our research, Yackee and Yackee also have used
a Cox Proportional Hazard model (but without the competing risks framework) to examine the duration of particular regulatory actions reported in the Unified Agenda. See
Yackee & Yackee, supra note 7,at 17 (finding that actions governed by statutory orjudicial deadlines take less time to complete).
77 For good statistical sources on hazard analysis, see WILLIAM H.
GREENE,
ECONOMETRIc ANALYSIS 715-27 (2d ed. 1993), and Janet M. Box-Steffensmeier & Bradford S. Jones, Time Is of the Essence: Event History Models in PoliticalScience, 41 AM. J. POL.
Sci. 1414 (1997).
78 Hazard analysis differs from standard ordinary least
squares analysis in that it
treats the dependent variable, length of the rulemaking process (in days), as a temporal variable, which permits the inclusion of censored observations and avoids the prediction of negative duration. GREENE, supra note 77, at 715-16. Unlike the exponential, lognormal, log-logisitic, and Weibull hazard models, the CPH model does not
impose a particular functional form on the baseline hazard function.
Box-
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Steffensmeier & Jones, supra note 77, at 1432-33. The model does, however, assume
that the proportionality of hazards across cases does not vary over time. Id. at 1433. In
other words, hazard functions of any two individuals with different covariate values differ only by a proportional factor. Janet M. Box-Steffensmeier & ChristopherJ.W. Zorn,
DurationModels and ProportionalHazards in PoliticalScience, 45 AM.J. POL. SCa. 972, 97475 (2001). The hazard rate for case i with the CPH model is h,(t) = e",ho(t), where fl'x is
the matrix of coefficients and covariates for the ith case and ho(t) is the baseline hazard
rate. Id. at 974. Due to the model's partial likelihood estimation, the baseline hazard
function is estimated nonparametrically. Box-Steffensmeier & Jones, supra note 77, at
1432-33.
The competing risks aspect of the CPH model accounts for the fact that an NPRM
in the Unified Agenda can result in one of several ultimate outcomes: a traditional final
rule or action, an interim final rule, a direct final rule, or a deletion or withdrawal. To
estimate the current model, we compress these outcomes into two categories: final
rule/action (traditional, interim, or direct) and deletion/withdrawal. In the 19882003 data, 10,967 RINs show a traditional final rule or action as the ultimate outcome;
79 RINs show an interim final rule as the ultimate outcome; 4 RINs show a direct final
rule as the ultimate outcome; 1316 RINs show deletion or withdrawal as the ultimate
outcome; and 2511 RINs with an NPRM show none of these outcomes. In the 19952003 data, 5972 RINs show a traditional final rule or action as the ultimate outcome;
64 RINs show an interim final rule as the ultimate outcome; 4 RINs show a direct final
rule as the ultimate outcome; 866 RINs show deletion or withdrawal as the ultimate
outcome; and 2059 RINs with an NPRM show no outcome. In each subset of the data,
the final category of RINs is treated as censored. In the 1995-2003 data, which we focus on, the average duration for final rules/actions (with and without deadlines, significant and nonsignificant) was 511.90 days (standard error = 7.96 days); for interim
final rules, the average duration was 696.75 days (standard error = 121.51); for direct
final rules, it was 1219.25 days (standard error = 263.05); and for withdrawals, it was
1541.07 days (standard error = 46.63). This analysis looks at ultimate actions for a particular RIN. Earlier analysis on interim and direct final rulemaking considered all reported actions for a RIN.
Many competing risks hazard models stratify the data by outcome types, permitting the baseline hazard function to vary by stratum, but constraining the regression
coefficients to be identical across strata. This approach, without the inclusion of explanatory variables dependent on particular strata, is problematic for our data. For
example, we want to consider whether a change in party control in Congress or the
White House between an NPRM and final outcome explains any of the variation in duration of the regulatory process. Change in party control of Congress or the White
House likely has opposing effects on duration, depending on the outcome. Change in
party control likely has a negative effect on duration (i.e., makes it shorter) if the
NPRM ends in withdrawal; indeed, a significant number of NPRMs were withdrawn
after control in Congress shifted in January 1995 and after President George W. Bush
took office in January 2001. See O'Connell, supra note 26, at 45. But change in party
control probably has a positive effect on duration if the NPRM ends in a rule. Agencies started off the rulemaking by pleasing one set of members; now, they have to make
changes before they finish it to please the current set of members. To deal with this
concern, the explanatory variables are included on their own and as interaction variables with the withdrawn or deleted actions stratum.
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coefficients predict shorter duration, and negative coefficients predict
longer duration. The results are presented in Table 13.
First, and most importantly, the presence of any deadline shortens
the duration of the regulatory process." ° Holding constant the effect
of other covariates, deadlines do shorten the time frame in which
agencies issue policy. Although deadlines also produce side effects,
they do quicken the pace of agency decisions. 8 These coefficients do

Table 13 presents estimates for the 1995-2003 data and for the 1988-2003
data.
We tested the competing risks model's key assumption that the proportionality of hazards across cases does not vary over time within each stratum. Because the model incorporates competing risks, standard tests of the proportionality assumption in commercial statistical packages (for example, the "stphtest" command in Stata) are not
appropriate. Instead, we plotted the observed and predicted survival probabilities for
each of the competing risks (rule completions and rule withdrawals); if the observed
and predicted probabilities are close, the model's assumption is supported. The probabilities are very close for rule completions over all values of the duration variable, and
close for rule withdrawals for shorter durations (but wider for longer durations), confirming that the key assumption holds for at least the first stratum and partially for the
second.
Although we think the CPH model is most appropriate in this setting, we have also
estimated a series of alternative models. The simplest, and least appropriate, is a simple ordinary least squares regression equation of duration of agency actions (from
NPRM to final rule, final action, interim final rule, or direct final rule) on the set of
explanatory variables (excluding the interaction terms). A Poisson regression is somewhat more appropriate because of the distribution of the dependent variable. We also
estimated other duration models using both the Weibull distribution and the exponential distribution, as well as a CPH model without the competing risks specification.
The main directional results (presence of deadline, significance of action, change in
Congress, and change in the White House) are robust to all these alternative specifications. Results are available from the authors.
80 This result also holds when separate variables are included
for statutory and judicial deadlines. The existence of a deadline, however, is not significant when that
process ends in withdrawal of an NPRM. This result may appear surprising at first, but
it also has an intuitive explanation. Deadlines are supposed to force agencies to actto enact some sort of regulation. To fail to complete a rulemaking, or to withdraw a
regulatory action, in the face of a deadline likely is highly unusual. See, e.g., Steven J.
Groseclose, Reinventing the Regulatory Agenda: Conclusions from an Empirical Study of
EPA's Clean Air Act Rulemaking ProgressProjections,53 MD. L. REV. 521, 562 (1994) (finding that the EPA was less likely to withdraw a rulemaking with a deadline). An agency
would not undertake withdrawal lightly and thus may take more time before choosing
that outcome.
81 This effect may be biased downward. To the extent
that agencies may set internal deadlines for particular rulemakings in the absence of statutory deadlines, nondeadline rulemaking processes will have a shorter duration than otherwise. In addition, to the extent that Congress signals to the agency that important rulemakings
should be finished promptly without the imposition of deadlines, nondeadline actions
will take less time. Cf Cornelius M. Kerwin & Scott R. Furlong, Time and Rulemaking:
An Empirical Test of Theory, 2J. PUB. ADMIN. REs. & THEORY 113, 129, 132 (1992) (find79
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not directly map onto measures of the actual change in duration, but
keeping all explanatory covariates at their means, in the first model
(1995-2003 Unified Agenda reports), the odds of a rulemaking with a
deadline coming to an end before a rulemaking without a deadline
are 1.37 to 1.82
Second, significant regulatory actions-in other words, rules with
bigger effects-unsurprisingly take longer to complete. Similarly,
regulatory actions with more comment periods also had longer durations in the first model. Third, change in party control of the White
House or Congress affects regulatory actions ending in withdrawal differently than actions that culminate in a final rule or action. If control of the White House or party control of Congress changes after the
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) is issued, the rulemaking
process takes longer if the process ends in completion; but the process
is shorter if the rule is deleted or withdrawn. (Both effects are compared to rulemakings where control does not shift.) Put differently,
when the Republicans took over Congress in 1995 and the White
House in 2001, there were two effects on pending rules. First, for
rules that were ultimately issued, there was greater delay. Second,
other rules were quickly withdrawn, and withdrawn more quickly than
rules withdrawn absent a shift in congressional or presidential control.
The relationship between the length of the regulatory process and
whether that process starts during a period of united government is
more complex. 3 In summary, deadlines do produce faster regulatory
action, but this effect interacts in important and somewhat surprising
ways with other sources of political and institutional variation8 4

ing that actions governed by judicial deadlines take much longer to complete than
those not governed byjudicial deadlines, in part because of prior agency delay).
82 This measure is obtained by calculating the expected hazard ratio with the
deadline covariate set to one and all other covariates set to their means, and calculating the expected hazard ratio with the deadline covariate set to zero and all other covariates set to their means. These ratios are, respectively, 0.29159 and 0.21221; the
odds reported in the text are calculated by taking their ratio.
83 For both CPH models in Table 13 (1995-2003 data and 1988-2003 data),
the
regulatory process for actions that ultimately end in withdrawal or deletion appears to
take longer if started under united government (though the result is not significant for
the first model). For the 1995-2003 data (where the model controls for the significance of the action), the process is also longer if it ends in completion of a rule,
whereas, for the 1988-2003 data (where the model does not control for the significance of the action), the process is shorter.
84 Although agencies make quicker decisions if they confront deadlines,
all else
being equal, they often miss the deadlines themselves. In the 1988-2003 data, of the
226 unique rulemakings for which specific dates were available for the statutory dead-
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DEADLINE DOCTRINES

Administrative law is forced to deal with deadlines in a wide range
of contexts, and in many, either the deadline distorts the ordinary
doctrinal contours or standard doctrines encourage counterproductive agency behavior. These negative results are neither uniform nor
inevitable, but they are frequent enough to cause genuine concern
about deadlines in administrative law. This Part canvasses how several

line for an NPRM to be issued and for the actual issuance of the NPRM, the agency
met the deadline in only 26.99% of the cases. In the 1995-2003 data, for the subset of
49 significant rulemakings, the agency satisfied the NPRM statutory deadline in
12.24% of the cases. The mean difference in days between the NPRM deadline and
the actual NPRM issuance was 169.67 days (past the deadline) (standard error =
30.36); for significant actions, the mean difference was 261.24 days (standard error =
60.29). Of the 1341 unique rulemakings with specific dates for a statutory deadline for
completed regulatory action and for the actual issuance of a final action (final rule,
action, interim final rule, or direct final rule), the agency met the deadline in only
18.94% of the cases. For the subset of 261 significant rulemakings, the agency satisfied
the completion deadline in 21.46% of the cases. The mean difference in days between
the completion deadline and the actual completion was 385.82 days (past the deadline) (standard error = 16.96); for significant actions, the mean difference was 508.26
days (standard error = 48.52).
The EPA's pattern of missing statutory deadlines has been well documented. See
U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILrIY OFFICE, GAO-05-613, CLEAN AIR ACT: EPA HAS COMPLETED MOST OF THE ACTIONS REQUIRED BY THE 1990 AMENDMENTS, BUT MANY WERE
COMPLETED LATE 7-12 & tbl.9 (2005) (finding that only 37 of 338 statutory deadlines
were met on time); U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-06-669, CLEAN AIR ACT:
EPA SHOULD IMPROVE THE MANAGEMENT OF ITS AIR TOXICS PROGRAM 15-20 (2006)
(finding that the EPA issued most air toxics requirements late); Groseclose, supra note
80, at 560-64 (noting that the EPA was less likely to miss court deadlines than statutory
deadlines); Pierce, supra note 7, at 81-82 (noting that the EPA met only 20% of the
Clean Air Act's statutory deadlines).
In some respects, agencies seem better at meeting judicial deadlines. In the 19882003 data, of the 139 unique rulemakings for which specific dates were available for
the judicial deadline for an NPRM to be issued and for the actual issuance of the
NPRM, the agency met the deadline in only 15.11% of the cases. In the 1995-2003
data, for the subset of 68 significant rulemakings, the agency satisfied the NPRM judicial deadline in 11.76% of the cases. But agencies did not delay as long. The mean
difference in days between the NPRM deadline and the actual NPRM issuance was
20.85 days (before the deadline) (standard error = 23.01); for significant actions, the
mean difference was 11.22 days (past the deadline) (standard error = 20.89). Of the
225 unique rulemakings with specific dates of ajudicial deadline for completed regulatory action and for the actual issuance of a final action (i.e., final rule, final action, interim final rule, or direct final rule), the agency met the deadline in only 14.22% of
the cases. For the subset of 79 significant rulemakings, the agency satisfied the completion deadline in 11.39% of the cases. The mean difference in days between the
completion deadline and the actual completion was 55.54 days (past the deadline)
(standard error = 9.41); for significant actions, the mean difference was 54.37 (standard error = 25.38).
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standard administrative law doctrines address the presence of a statutory deadline. First, it considers how deadlines provide a rare opportunity for parties to successfully sue for agency inaction under section
706(1) of the APA. Second, it examines procedural and substantive
challenges to agency actions enacted in the face of deadlines. If an
agency promulgates a rule required by a deadline but fails to use traditional notice and comment procedures, some courts will strike down
such action on procedural grounds, rejecting any "good cause" exception to the notice and comment requirements of section 553 of the
APA. When an agency's statutory interpretation is challenged under
the standard framework of Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,85 a deadline will likely make it harder for an agency
to emerge victorious. When agency actions are challenged as arbitrary
and capricious, deadlines have an ambiguous effect. Little case law
exists, and facially plausible arguments suggest both net advantages
and disadvantages for agency litigation. Third, this Part explores how
deadlines affect the authority of courts to fashion remedies when
agencies do not meet their obligations, and considers whether deadlines present any constitutional problems. Although statutory deadlines are generally assumed to be legally uncontroversial, there are
several reasons why deadlines might be constitutionally suspect.
A. Agency Inaction
Federal courts generally have extremely limited jurisdiction to
"compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed"
under section 706(1) of the APA. s6 In Norton v. Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance, the Supreme Court ruled that "a claim under § 706(1)
can proceed only where a plaintiff asserts that an agency failed to take
a discrete agency action that it is required to take.""' The Court refused to
allow environmental groups to challenge the Bureau of Land Management's failure to limit off-road vehicle use on public lands under

85

86

467 U.S. 837 (1984).
5 U.S.C. § 706(1) (2000); see also William D. Araiza, In Praise of a Skeletal APA:

Norton v. Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance, JudicialRemedies for Agency Inaction, and
the Questionable Value ofAmending the APA, 56 ADMIN. L. REV. 979, 993 (2004) (" [C] ourts

should take care to respect agency decisionmaking processes when considering the
timing of review, the liability determination ...and the remedy."); Biber, supra note 7,
at 4-5 (noting the Supreme Court's chilly reception to attempts by private parties to
compel agency action); Bressman, supra note 18, at 1658 (discussing the Supreme
Court's reluctance to permitjudicial review of agency inaction).
87 542 U.S. 55, 64 (2004).
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the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976."8 The Court,
however, explicitly indicated that statutory deadlines could establish
the discrete mandatory action needed to bring a challenge under section 706(1), s9 a view consistent with previous lower court decisions."
Deadlines stand out as one of the few areas where courts will compel
agencies to act despite multiple demands on their resources.
The Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance analysis is part of the Court's
general administrative law doctrine, but specific statutes also carve out
jurisdiction for courts to review agency inaction. Under the Clean Air
Act, citizen suits are expressly permitted, presuming standing and
other jurisdictional requirements are met, "against the Administrator
[of the EPA] where there is alleged a failure of the Administrator to
perform any act or duty under this chapter which is not discretionary."9' Many district courts have held that missed statutory deadlines
in the Clean Air Act satisfy this citizen suit provision. 9' The Clean Water Act has an identical provision, 93 and, as with the Clean Air Act,
many district courts have ruled that an agency's
failure to meet a
94
statutory deadline qualifies under this provision.

88

Id. at 65-72.

89

Id. at 71-72.

90 In Sierra Club v. Thomas, the D.C. Circuit explained how a deadline
is almost al-

ways necessary to create a nondiscretionary duty:
Although a date-certain deadline therefore may or may not be nondiscretionary, it is highly improbable that a deadline will ever be nondiscretionary, i.e.
clear-cut, if it exists only by reason of an inference drawn from the overall
statutory framework.... The inferrable deadline is likely to impose such a dis-

cretionary duty because it rests, at bottom, upon a statutory framework that
will almost necessarily place competing demands upon the agency's time and
resources.

828 F.2d 783, 791 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (footnote omitted). The court continued, "In the
absence of a readily-ascertainable deadline, therefore, it will be almost impossible to
conclude that Congress accords a particular agency action such high priority as to impose upon the agency a 'categorical[] mandat[e]' that deprives it of all discretion over
the timing of its work." Id. (alterations in original) (footnote omitted); cf Raymond
Proffitt Found. v. U.S. EPA, 930 F. Supp. 1088, 1099-1100 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (holding
that a deadline may be sufficient, but is not necessary, to show a nondiscretionary
duty).
91 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a) (2) (2000).
92 See, e.g., Envtl. Def. v. Leavitt, 329 F. Supp. 2d 55, 64 (D.D.C.
2004); Natural Res.
Def. Council, Inc. v. U.S. EPA, 797 F. Supp. 194, 196 (E.D.N.Y. 1992); Sierra Club v.

Ruckelshaus, 602 F. Supp. 892, 903-04 (N.D. Cal. 1984).
93 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (2) (2000).

See, e.g., Defenders of Wildlife v. Browner, 888 F. Supp. 1005, 1008 (D. Ariz. 1995).
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There are, however, substantial limits on the scope of judicial review of agency inaction, even if deadlines generally make it easier for
parties to win "unreasonable delay" cases on the margin.95 Parties
must meet applicable statutes of limitations, 96 have standing to sue, 97
and bring a live case.98 Most critically, in agency inaction suits involving deadlines where "the manner of... action is left to the agency's
discretion," courts "can compel the agency to act, but [have] no
power to specify what the action must be." 99 A statutory deadline,

95
96

Biber, supra note 7, at 29.

In Centerfor BiologicalDiversity v. Hamilton, the Eleventh Circuit ruled that
envi-

ronmental groups could not bring a lawsuit to mandate that the Secretary of Interior
designate a critical habitat for two endangered species of minnows under the Endangered Species Act because the Secretary's failure to act was not a continuing violation
that extended beyond the statute of limitations. 453 F.3d 1331, 1335-36 (11th Cir.
2006). Generally, if the statute does not otherwise specify, parties have six years after a
deadline has passed to challenge agency inaction. 28 U.S.C. § 2401 (a) (2000); Ctr. for
BiologicalDiversity,453 F.3d at 1334.

9' See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992) (requiring (a)
"an injury in fact" that is (b) "fairly traceable" to the challenged action, and (c) that
the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable decision (internal quotation marks
and alterations omitted)). See generally Cass R. Sunstein, What's Standing After Lujan?
Of Citizen Suits, "Injuries,"and Article III, 91 MICH. L. REV. 163 (1992) (criticizing Lujan's
narrow view of standing). Proving standing under current precedent can be quite difficult, particularly when the agency's inaction does not concern regulation of the
plaintiffs themselves. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561-62; cf Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct.
1438, 1452-58 (2007) (holding that the plaintiffs had standing to challenge the EPA's
refusal to regulate greenhouse gases).
98 Challenges to compel agency action will also typically
become moot once the
agency acts, even if far beyond the deadline, because after the agency acts, the court
cannot "grant any relief beyond requiring steps that [the agency] has already taken."
Sierra Club v. Browner, 130 F. Supp. 2d 78, 82 (D.D.C. 2001); see also Church of Scientology of Calif. v. United States, 506 U.S. 9, 12 (1992) ("[I]f an event occurs while a
case is pending on appeal that makes it impossible for the court to grant any effectual
relief whatever to a prevailing party, the appeal must be dismissed." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness Alliance, 542 U.S. 55, 65 (2004). The Court continued:
For example, 47 U.S.C. § 251(d) (1), which required the Federal Communications Commission "to establish regulations to implement" interconnection requirements "[w]ithin 6 months" of the date of enactment of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, would have supported a judicial decree under the APA
requiring the prompt issuance of regulations, but not a judicial decree setting
forth the content of those regulations.
Id. (alteration in original).
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therefore, may spur a court to order the agency to act, but will almost
never allow the court to specify the content of that action. 00
B. Late Agency Action
If the agency imposes legal obligations once a statutory deadline
has passed, does the presence of the deadline nullify the agency's action? The Supreme Court's most recent pronouncement was a clear
no-at least unless Congress clearly specifies otherwise-but the
Court was sharply split. In Barnhart v. Peabody Coal Co., the Court upheld the Commissioner of Social Security's late assignment of beneficiaries to coal companies for the payment of health insurance premiums under the Coal Industry Retiree Health Benefit Act of 1992.101
The Court acknowledged that the Commissioner "had no discretion
to choose to leave the assignments until after the prescribed date, and
[that] the assignments in issue here represent a default on a statutory
duty, though it may well be a wholly blameless one."10 2 But the Court
refused to strike down the Commissioner's dilatory action as lacking
legal authority because the Coal Act did not explicitly provide for what
would happen in such a case. As the Court concluded, "' [I]f a statute
does not specify a consequence for noncompliance with statutory timing provisions, the federal courts will not in the ordinary course impose their own coercive sanction."' 10 3 This analysis was consistent with
100Challenges to agency inaction based on missed deadlines also present interesting jurisdictional questions as to what level of court should first hear such claims.
These challenges are typically heard in district court, in contrast to claims involving
agency action. See STEPHEN G. BREYER ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY
POLIcY 752-53 (6th ed. 2006). Many statutes, including the Clean Air Act and Clean
Water Act, prescribe that parties must first try to set aside an agency action in the
Court of Appeals. See 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b) (1) (2000) (prescribing appellate jurisdiction for challenges to particular agency actions under the Clean Air Act); 33 U.S.C.
§ 1369(b) (1) (2000) (setting similar jurisdictional rules for challenges under the Clean
Water Act).
101537 U.S. 149, 155, 171-72 (2003).
102 Id. at 157.
103 Id. at 159 (quoting United States v.James Daniel Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. 43,
63 (1993)). The Peabody Court, id. at 160-63, relied on another missed statutory deadline case, Brock v. Pierce County. In that case, which involved late action by the Secretary
of Labor, the Court was extremely hesitant "to conclude that every failure of an agency
to observe a procedural requirement voids subsequent agency action, especially when
important public rights are at stake." 476 U.S. 253, 260 (1986). The Court reasoned
that "[wihen, as here, there are less drastic remedies available for failure to meet a
statutory deadline, courts should not assume that Congress intended the agency to lose
its power to act." Id. (footnote omitted). The Supreme Court in Peabody and Pierce
County did not explicitly discuss laggard agency action in terms of the APA. If an
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lower court decisions, which have generally upheld binding agency
policies enacted after a statutory deadline has passed, so long as the4
statute does not spell out explicit consequences for late action.'
What courts then struggle with is determining whether the statute
provides such consequences.105
Although this doctrinal result is clear enough, it is also subject to
criticism. Suppose a statute grants legal authority to a new agency, but
also sunsets it at the end of the year. The most plausible inference is
that the agency has no power after the source of its legal authority
terminates. Why should deadlines be different? After all, deadlines
require that an agency take some action by a certain date. Prior to
that date, the action is presumptively lawful, but after the date, the
agency is acting in contravention of the legal authority for its action.
Under this view, late action in the face of a deadline does not seem all
that different in kind from late agency action after the sunset of a
statute. However, missing a deadline in a broad statutory scheme also
seems distinct from the expiration of a narrow grant of statutory authority. Regardless, the deadline doctrine for late action highlights
the importance of hammer provisions, which specify regulatory outcomes in the event that an agency fails to meet a statutory deadline.0 6

agency misses a mandatory deadline without justification, such late action would arguably qualify as "an abuse of discretion" under section 706(2) (A) of the APA. Cf Int'l
Union, United Auto. Workers v. Chao, 361 F.3d 249, 254 (3d Cir. 2004) (finding a
missed deadline not to be an abuse of discretion because the deadline was aspirational,
not mandatory); Action on Smoking & Health v. Dep't of Labor, 100 F.3d 991, 993
(D.C. Cir. 1996) (same). But if the agency has acted, albeit late, a section 706(2) (A)
challenge likely will be moot or provide no considerable remedy.
104 See, e.g., Newton County Wildlife Ass'n v. U.S. Forest
Serv., 113 F.3d 110, 112
(8th Cir. 1997) ("Absent specific statutory direction, an agency's failure to meet a
mandatory time limit does not void subsequent agency action."); Linemaster Switch
Corp. v. U.S. EPA, 938 F.2d 1299, 1304 (D.C. Cir. 1991) ("We are especially reluctant
to so curb EPA's substantive authority [to add sites to the National Priorities List] in
light of Supreme Court decisions declining to restrict agencies' powers when Congress
has not indicated any intent to do so and has crafted less drastic remedies for the
agency's failure to act.").
105 See, e.g., Dixie Fuel Co. v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 171 F.3d
1052, 1063-64 (6th Cir.
1999), rev'd, Peabody, 537 U.S. at 172. Late agency action may raise additional concerns
if the agency wants its action to apply retroactively. See Bowen v. Georgetown Univ.
Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 224-25 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring) ("If... a statute prescribes
a deadline by which particular rules must be in effect, and if the agency misses that
deadline, the statute may be interpreted to authorize a reasonable retroactive rule despite the limitation of the APA.").
106 See generalyJEFFREYS. LUBBERS, A GUIDE TO FEDERAL AGENCY RULEMAKING
1516 (4th ed. 2006) (discussing the use of hammers as "penalties if an agency fails to take
timely action"); Magill, supra note 7, at 153-56 (describing hammers as providing a
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Hammer provisions can implement "a congressionally specified regulatory result."'07 Or they can implement an agency's proposed rule if
the agency does not promulgate the final rule before the deadline.'l 8
These provisions often impose "harsh[] default prohibitions" to motivate quicker agency action.' 00 In sum, the absence of a congressionally
specified hammer will generally prevent courts from striking down
agency action simply for missing a deadline.
C. ProceduralChallenges
Deadlines impose significant constraints on agency resources,
and, therefore, agencies often forego notice and comment rulemaking (detailed in section 553 of the APA) for deadline-driven actions.
And because most deadlines guide significant regulatory actions or
legislative rules, notice and comment is the default procedural requirement. Agencies faced with deadlines, however, often contend
that deadlines require pressed work, making "notice and public procedure thereon... impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the
public interest," and therefore within the APA's "good cause" exception to notice and comment requirements. " 0
Much of the considerable case law in this area concerns the 1977
amendments to the Clean Air Act."' In 1978, the EPA received plans
from states designating areas as compliant and noncompliant with national ambient air quality standards for various air pollutants. Subse-

strong incentive for agencies to meet deadlines); Richard C. Fortuna, The Birth of the
Hammer,ENVrL. F., Sept.-Oct. 1990, at 18, 20-21 (recounting the 1982 proposal to add
hammer provisions to the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act in response to the
Carter EPA's indifferent implementation). Such provisions are more popular in divided government. Cf id. (describing the importance of divided government to motivating the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act hammer provisions).
107 See LUBBERS, supra note 106, at 16 (discussing the hammer provision in the
1984 amendments to the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 6924(d)(1)-(2)(2000)).
108See Magill, supra note 7,at 155 (discussing the hammer provisions inthe Nutrition Labeling and Education Act of 1990).
109 Bradley C. Karkkainen, Information-ForcingEnvironmental Regulation,
33 FLA. ST.
U. L. REv. 861, 883 (2006); see also Mark Seidenfeld, A Big PictureApproach to Presidential
Influence on Agency Policy-Making, 80 IOwA L.REV. 1, 8 n.40 (1994) ("A hammer provision ...leaves the agency discretion to generate a regulatory scheme in the first instance, but threatens ...forfeiture of that discretion should the agency fail to comply
with the statutory deadline.").
5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (3)(B) (2000).
LUBBERS, supra note 106, at 111; Ellen R. Jordan, The Administrative Procedure
Act's "Good Cause"Exemption, 36 ADMIN.L. REV. 113, 125-29 (1984).
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quently, the EPA Administrator promulgated a rule without prior
comment in the face of a statutory deadline, modifying those plans
and imposing various obligations under the Act.
Five courts of appeals ruled that the Administrator did not have the requisite "good
cause" to eschew the APA's notice and comment provisions;1 3 two
courts of appeals sustained the Administrator's choice of harried procedure.1 4 The first set of courts emphasized that the Administrator
had sufficient time to provide notice on the proposals and to take
comment before promulgating a final rule."5 Many of the courts also
argued that the agency did not treat the statutory deadline as "sacrosanct," since the agency published the final rule a month after the
deadline.11 6 They also rejected the agency's argument that by providing an opportunity for comments after promulgating the rule, the
agency cured any procedural problems."' For these courts, the EPA
had failed to meet its burden to show that it met the narrow "good
cause" exemption to notice and comment rulemaking.
The Sixth and Seventh Circuits accepted the EPA Administrator's
reliance on the "good cause" exemption. Both courts concluded that
1

113

Jordan, supranote 111, at 126.
U.S. Steel Corp. v. EPA, 649 F.2d 572, 575 (8th Cir. 1981); W. Oil & Gas Ass'n v.

U.S. EPA, 633 F.2d 803, 812 (9th Cir. 1980); New Jersey v. U.S. EPA, 626 F.2d 1038,
1045 (D.C. Cir. 1980); U.S. Steel Corp. v. U.S. EPA, 595 F.2d 207, 214 (5th Cir. 1979);
Sharon Steel Corp. v. EPA, 597 F.2d 377, 379 (3d Cir. 1979); see alsoJordan,supra note
111, at 127-28 (summarizing the conflict among the appellate courts).
114 Republic Steel Corp. v. Costle, 621 F.2d 797, 803 (6th Cir.
1980); U.S. Steel
Corp. v. U.S. EPA, 605 F.2d 283, 286-90 (7th Cir. 1979). The Supreme Court refused
to resolve the circuit split. See U.S. Steel Corp. v. U.S. EPA, 444 U.S. 1035 (1980) (denying certiorari).
" See, e.g., Sharon Steel, 597 F.2d at 380. These courts emphasized that the EPA
gave no reason for "why it could not at least have published the.., initial list[s] upon
receipt and accepted comments during the time it was reviewing the list[s] ." U.S. Steel
Corp. v. U.S. EPA, 595 F.2d 207, 213 (5th Cir. 1979). Such quick action "would have
afforded petitioners some warning of the imminent designations and allowed them
opportunity to influence the agency's action." Id.; see also New Jersey, 626 F.2d at 1047.
li6 U.S. Steel Corp. v. U.S. EPA, 595 F.2d 207, 213 (5th Cir. 1979); see also New Jersey, 626 F.2d at 1043 n.3; Sharon Stee4 597 F.2d at 379 n.4. The courts also pointed to
the agency's own repeated remarks that the designations in the final rule were "preliminary" in the statute's regulatory scheme, suggesting that the agency could have issued the designations as a proposed rule. See, e.g., New Jersey, 626 F.2d at 1042 (citing
U.S. Steel Corp. v. U.S. EPA, 595 F.2d 207, 214 (5th Cir. 1979)).
17 See U.S. Steel Corp. v. U.S. EPA, 595 F.2d 207,
214-15 (5th Cir. 1979) ("Were we
to allow the EPA to prevail on this point we would make the provisions of § 553 virtually unenforceable. An agency that wished to dispense with pre-promulgation notice
and comment could simply do so, invite post-promulgation comment, and republish
the regulation before a reviewing court could act."); see also New Jersey, 626 F.2d at 1049;
Sharon Steel, 597 F.2d at 381.
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the statutory deadline made prior notice and comment impractical.
The Sixth Circuit concluded that courts that had held the opposite
"appear to us to ignore the sense of urgency which characterized the
Congressional debate preceding the passage of the Clean Air Act
Amendments of 1977. " "8

The Seventh Circuit similarly ruled that

"the 'good cause' exception may be utilized to comply with the rigors
of a tight statutory schedule."'1 9 These two courts were therefore not
troubled by the agency's provision of post-rule commenting. 2 ° Finally, the courts emphasized that upholding the agency's harried procedures served the public interest." The Sixth Circuit put it bluntly:
"Past experience has taught this court that remand means an additional two-year delay in achieving national air quality standards in
Ohio."

12
1

In lieu of a bright-line rule on deadlines and good cause, courts
typically apply a multifactor analysis in assessing whether an agency
can rely on a deadline to forego traditional notice and comment procedures.1 23 Courts permit agencies to deviate from standard APA
rulemaking procedures where the deadline is "very tight and where
the statute is particularly complicated." 2 4 But the agency cannot generally create its own emergency by waiting to act until quite close to

118

Republic Steel, 621 F.2d at 804. The Sixth Circuit did not find the issue close: "If

the circumstances of this case do not justify employment of the good cause exception,
we will be hard put to find anyjustification for its use." Id.
119 U.S. Steel Corp. v. U.S. EPA, 605 F.2d 283, 287 (7th Cir. 1979).
120 See, e.g., Republic Stee 621 F.2d at 804 ("Under these circumstances,
we think
that the Administrator's solution of promulgating a schedule of nonattainment areas
and subsequently receiving objections and comment, and thereafter effecting such
changes as were required, was a reasonable approach consistent with the Administrative Procedures Act.").
121 As the Seventh Circuit explained, "We have already noted the Congressional
concern manifest in the Clean Air Act that national attainment be achieved as expeditiously as practicable. This concern was reflected in the desire that the due administration of the statutory scheme not be impeded by endless litigation over technical and
procedural irregularities." U.S. Steel Corp. v. U.S. EPA, 605 F.2d 283, 290 (7th Cir.
1979).
' Republic Steel, 621 F.2d at 804.
23 Most importantly, the mere existence of a deadline is not sufficient for establishing good cause. See, e.g., Natural Res. Def. Council v. Abraham, 355 F.3d 179,
205-06 (2d Cir. 2004).
124 Methodist Hosp. of Sacramento v. Shalala, 38 F.3d 1225, 1236 (D.C.
Cir. 1994).
Courts have viewed forty-nine and sixty days as sufficiently "tight," but not six, twelve,
or fourteen months. See Nat'l Women, Infants & Children Grocers Ass'n v. Food &
Nutrition Serv., 416 F. Supp. 2d 92, 106 (D.D.C. 2006) (citing cases from the courts of
appeals).
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the deadline. 125 Courts are also more accommodating of missed procedural mandates if the agency action is "of limited scope or duration."126 Finally, courts "give[] greater weight to congressional deadlines in justifying lack of notice and comment when the deadlines
implemented budget-cutting measures." 127 In short, an agency must
exercise care in skipping notice and comment procedures, but if the
ordinary requirements of notice and comment are truly burdensome
given the statute's time constraints, the agency's decision to avoid
costly and time-consuming procedures is likely to be upheld.""
D. Substantive Challenges
Deadlines also significantly affect how courts engage in substantive
review of agency decisions. Explicit deadlines often make it easier for
the reviewing court to find related language unambiguous and to
strike down agency attempts to modify it. But deadlines may make a
reviewing court less skeptical of rushed agency action, upholding
more agency actions against arbitrary and capricious challenges.

125

Methodist Hosp., 38 F.3d at 1237 (citing Council of S. Mountains, Inc. v. Dono-

van, 653 F.2d 573, 581 (D.C. Cir. 1981)).
For example, interim final rulemaking that
126 LUBBERS, supra note 106, at 111.
precedes final rulemaking is more acceptable. Am. Transfer & Storage Co. v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 719 F.2d 1283, 1294 (5th Cir. 1983).
127 LUBBERS, supra note 106, at 112.
128Congress may, of course, simultaneously set deadlines and explicitly waive
APA
requirements in a statutory scheme, as it has occasionally done. For example, section
161 (d) of Title I of the Federal Agriculture Improvement and Reform Act of 1996 prescribed that the Secretary of Agriculture and the Commodity Credit Corporation
promulgate regulations within ninety days "without regard to... the notice and comment provisions of section 553 of Title 5." 7 U.S.C. § 7281(d)(1) (2000); see also
7 U.S.C. § 1522 note, Act ofJuly 24, 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-20, tit. II, ch. 1, § 2103, 115
Stat. 155, 165 (mandating that "[n]ot later than August 1, 2001, the Federal Crop Insurance Corporation shall promulgate final regulations to carry out section 522(b) of
the Federal Crop Insurance Act..., without regard to... the notice and comment
provisions of section 553"); 16 U.S.C. § 3831(k) (3) (I) (ii) (Supp. V 2005) (requiring
regulations implementing the Emergency Supplemental Appropriations To Address
Hurricanes in the Gulf of Mexico and Pandemic Influenza to be issued within ninety
days "without regard to ... the notice and comment provisions of section 553 of
title 5").
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1. Chevron
In the familiar Chevron framework, courts engage in a two-part inquiry in examining an agency interpretation of a statute:
First, always, is the question whether Congress has directly spoken to the
precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the
end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to
the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress. If, however, the court
determines Congress has not directly addressed the precise question at
issue, the court does not simply impose its own construction on the statute, as would be necessary in the absence of an administrative interpretation. Rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency's answer is
based on a permissible construction of the statute.129

Recent case law appears to have added a prior Chevron "Step Zero"
to this analysis. 13° United States v. Mead Corp.'3' and its progeny suggest
that the degree of deference courts owe to an agency's statutory interpretation is partly a function of the procedures used to generate an
agency decision.l12 Judicial deference is appropriate "when it appears
that Congress delegated authority to the agency generally to make
rules carrying the force of law, and that the agency interpretation
authority." 3 3
claiming deference was promulgated in the exercise of that
How do statutory deadlines fit into this Chevron framework? Consider Step Zero. If the agency failed to use notice and comment procedures because of a deadline, the lack of formal procedures might
indicate Chevron deference ought not to apply. 13 After Mead, informal

129

Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43

(1984) (footnotes omitted).
130 See Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187, 191 (2006) (defining
Chevron "Step Zero" as the initial determination of whether the Chevron framework applies). The term originally appeared in Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman,
Chevron 'sDomain,89 GEO. L.J. 833, 836 (2001).
131 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
See Lisa Schultz Bressman, How Mead Has Muddled JudicialReview of Agency Action, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1443, 1486 (2005); Sunstein, supra note 130, at 213-16; see also
Adrian Vermeule, Introduction: Mead in the Trenches, 71 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 347 (2003)
132

(considering how Mead affected the D.C. Circuit's jurisprudence).

Mead, 533 U.S. at 226-27.
Recent statements suggest that procedural formality is neither a necessary nor a
sufficient condition for deference, but that judicial deference is much more likely
when agency views are articulated using formal procedures like notice and comment
rulemaking. Mead's language initially appeared to make Step Zero turn entirely on
procedural formality. Unfortunately, the precise relationship between the delegation
of force-of-law authority and procedural formality remained elusive. The Court clearly
133
13
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procedures (such as policy statements or guidance documents) are
less likely to receive judicial deference. By the same token, if the
agency had "good cause" to avoid notice and comment, the rule is a
perfectly valid legislative rule. Because most legislative rules will qualify for deference at Step Zero, the deadline could make it easier for
the agency to receive deference for substantively important views that
were articulated informally.
This latter possibility is tempered by the way deadlines are analyzed at Chevron Step One. Explicit statutory deadlines usually prevent
agencies from changing or ignoring those timetables for themselves'35
or for regulated entities 1 6 to avoid conflict with clear congressional
intent. Congress's intent about the timing of agency actions in explicit deadline statutes is not ambiguous. By contrast, absent a dead-

stated that a lack of procedural formality does not preclude Chevron deference. See
Mead, 533 U.S. at 231 ("The fact that the tariff classification here was not a product of
such formal process does not alone, therefore, bar the application of Chevron."). And
at leastJustice Breyer thinks procedural formality is not a sufficient condition for Chevron deference either. See Nat'l Cable & Telecomm. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs.,
545 U.S. 967, 1004-05 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring) ("It is not a sufficient condition
because Congress may have intended not to leave the matter of a particular interpretation up to the agency, irrespective of the procedure the agency uses to arrive at that
interpretation .. ").
135 See, e.g., Delaney v. EPA, 898 F.2d 687, 691 (9th Cir. 1990) ("When
Congress
has explicitly set an absolute deadline, congressional intent is clear.... The EPA cannot extract leeway from a statute that Congress explicitly intended to be strict."), superseded by statute, Clean Air Act Amendments, Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2399 (1990),
as recognized in Ober v. U.S. EPA, 84 F.3d 304, 311-12 (9th Cir. 1996); infra note 151
and accompanying text.
136 See, e.g., Natural Res. Def. Council v. EPA, 489 F.3d 1364,
1374 (D.C. Cir. 2007)
("Congress has spoken on the question and has not provided EPA with authority under [the statute] to extend the compliance date in [its] 2006 rule."); Sierra Club v.
EPA, 311 F.3d 853, 862 (7th Cir. 2002) ("In sum, Congress addressed in great detail
the circumstances under and extent to which the EPA could grant exceptions to the
nonattainment schedule. Extensions where the failure is the result of transported
ozone are not among them.... [U]nder our system of government, it is not our business or the EPA's business to rewrite a clear statute so that it will better reflect 'common sense and the public weal.'"); Abramowitz v. U.S. EPA, 832 F.2d 1071, 1077-78
(9th Cir. 1987) ("Although it is axiomatic that a reviewing court cannot substitute its
judgment for that of the administrative agency, it is equally well established that a
court cannot defer to agency discretion when the intent of the Act is clear.... We
conclude that EPA exceeded its authority by approving [particular regulatory measures] ... without requiring a demonstration [that the statutory deadline would be
met]."), superseded by statute, Clean Air Act Amendments, Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104 Stat.
2399 (1990), as recognized in Hall v. U.S. EPA, 273 F.3d 1146, 1159 (9th Cir. 2001). But
see Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. EPA, 22 F.3d 1125, 1135-36 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (per
curiam) (permitting the agency to extend statutory deadlines for compliance in particular circumstances).
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line, statutory silence generates sufficient ambiguity to provide
for
17
agency discretion and judicial deference with respect to timing. 3
2. Arbitrary and Capricious Review
Section 706(2) (A) of the APA prescribes that the "reviewing court
shall... hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be ... arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion,
or otherwise not in accordance with law."13 8 In assessing whether the
agency has acted in an arbitrary or capricious manner, courts generally engage in a searching inquiry to determine whether an agency has
"examine[d] the relevant data and articulate[d] a satisfactory explanation for its action[,] including a rational connection between the facts
found and the choice made."

139

Little case law directly addresses deadlines in arbitrary and capricious review, but the inquiry raises several critical implications for
agency behavior. On one hand, courts could apply a less searching
standard for actions promulgated under deadline, 14 requiring less
from the agency in terms of either procedure or substance.14' This

Might a court find a statute's timing provisions ambiguous, thereby satisfying
Chevron Step One, but nonetheless conclude the agency's interpretation of those provisions is unlawful? This is possible, but not particularly likely. Although there are
court decisions in which agencies lose at Step Two, such an outcome is rare. See generally Ronald M. Levin, The Anatomy of Chevron: Step Two Reconsidered, 72 CHI.-KENT L.
REv. 1253, 1260-62 (1997).
138 5 U.S.C. § 706,
706(2) (a) (2000).
139 Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of
the U.S. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463
U.S. 29, 43 (1983) (internal quotation marks omitted).
140 AsJack Beermann explains in
the context ofjudicial deadlines,
137

Courts might... be reluctant to cast doubt on the legality of rules in ...
situations in which agencies promulgate rules under external compulsion ....
Under the influence of a court decree, an agency may issue a rule that deviates from actual administrative preferences. One could argue that the agency
did not seriously consider comments that were contrary to the push or pull of
the external force such as the judicial order.... Courts are unlikely to accept
these arguments, which in effect would hamper courts' ability to enforce their
judgments regarding proper administrative conduct.
Jack M. Beermann, PresidentialPower in Transitions,83 B.U. L. REV. 947, 1002-03 (2003);
cf Pierce, supra note 7, at 74-75, 88 (discussing Judge Easterbrook's view that courts
should relax their review of actions completed by resource-starved agencies).
141 Some limited case law also supports this argument.
In CaliforniaHuman Development Corp. v. Brock, the D.C. Circuit upheld an allocation of funds by the Department
of Labor (DOL) as rational, given a deadline:
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idea of reducing the intensity of arbitrary and capricious review because of statutory deadlines142 or agency resource constraints 4 has
been advocated by a number of prominent scholars-but case law on
point is scarce and there are also reasons to resist ad hoc exceptions to
standard doctrines ofjudicial review.
Agencies may act poorly when rushed-for example, they may not
consider necessary alternatives, not explain their choices, or not act
consistent with standard doctrinal requirements. Standard arbitrary
and capricious review requires courts to strike down an agency action
as arbitrary and capricious
if the agency.., relied on factors which Congress has not intended it to
consider, entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem,
offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter to the evidence
before the agency, or [was] so implausible that it could not be ascribed
to a difference in view or the product of agency expertise.144

When agencies sacrifice deliberative process to meet deadlines,
decisions seem more likely to fail the arbitrary and capricious inquiry.

The DOL's actions were rational, given the information that the DOL had at
the time the agency promulgated the regulations. Complex decisions had to
be made in a short time span. The change in allocation pattern was mainly
due to the substitution of the 1980 Census data for the 1977 Social Security
data. That choice must be laid at the doorstep of the Congress. At least for
the DOL's fiscal year 1983 and 1984 allocations, this court cannot find the
agency's allocation formula to be arbitrary and capricious.
762 F.2d 1044, 1051 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (internal quotation marks, footnote, and alterations omitted); cf. Hercules Inc. v. EPA, 598 F.2d 91, 129 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (explicitly
relying on the presence of a statutory deadline to uphold the agency's questionable
actions in a challenge under APA section 557(b)).
142 Cf Cross, supra note 41, at 1027-36
(discussing the adverse effects of challenges
to agency inaction); R. Shep Melnick, Administrative Law and BureaucraticReality, 44
ADMIN. L. REV. 245, 249-51 (1992) (suggesting that litigation over deadlines can undermine agencies' abilities to regulate effectively); R. Shep Melnick, The Political Roots
of the JudicialDilemma, 49 ADMIN. L. REv. 585, 589-91 (1997) (arguing that courts ignore the disparity between agency resources and the demands imposed on them by
deadlines).
143 See Biber, supra note 7, at 47 (arguing that courts
should "defer to agency decisions about resource allocation" unless an agency is "flouting the will of Congress");
Pierce, supra note 7, at 93-94 (suggesting that courts "should excuse agencies from the
duty to comply with a statutory deadline" when compliance would require the agency
to "violat[e] another statute"); cf. Cass R. Sunstein, Reviewing Agency Inaction After Heckler v. Chaney, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 653, 670 (1985) (characterizing resource allocation
decisions as generally "consistent with congressional will").
144 State Farm,463 U.S.
at 43.
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If courts do not relax ordinary requirements,145 then agencies will lose
more often in challenges to deadline actions.
E. JudicialRemedies
Statutory schemes that impose deadlines on agency action rarely
grant explicit permission to agencies or courts to modify those deadlines, but there are some exceptions. 146 The Freedom of Information
Act, for instance, sets strict deadlines for agencies to release nonexempt information. Agencies have only twenty days, with the possibility
of a ten-day extension, to determine "whether to comply with [a] request and... [to] immediately notify the person making such request
of such determination and the reasons therefor, and of the right of
such person to appeal to the head of the agency any adverse determination." 47 However, the statute expressly allows the court to grant the
agency additional time if the agency meets certain requirements.'48
Indeed, many agencies almost never meet these statutory deadlines.
Most statutes that impose deadlines are silent about what should
happen if the agency misses the deadline. Courts generally "will not
blindly enforce a time limit without regard to the reasonableness of an
agency's action." 149 Instead, courts can, without express authorization
in the statute, give an agency more time to comply with a deadline if it
would be impossible for the agency, operating in good faith, to meet
it. 150 For example, in NaturalResources Defense Council, Inc. v. Train, the
D.C. Circuit noted two circumstances where a court could use its equitable powers to provide the agency additional time: when meeting

145 Cf Salameda v. INS, 70 F.3d 447, 452 (7th Cir. 1995) ("[U]nderstaffing
is not a
defense to a violation of principles of administrative law. . . "); Pierce, supra note 7, at
73-75 (discussing the Salameda case).
146 See Abbott, Cost-Benefit Appraisal supra note
7, at 177-78 (discussing statutory
escape clauses, which excuse agency noncompliance with deadlines).
147 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (6) (2000).
148 See id. § 552(a) (6) (C) (i) ("If the Government
can show exceptional circum-

stances exist and that the agency is exercising due diligence in responding to the request, the court may retain jurisdiction and allow the agency additional time to complete its review of the records."). This additional time is termed an Open America stay.
See Open Am. v. Watergate Special Prosecution Force, 547 F.2d 605, 615-16 (D.C. Cir.
1976).
149 Abbott, Cost-Benefit Appraisal supra note
7, at 178.
150 Id.
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deadlines would unduly jeopardize the implementation of other essential programs and where compliance is technologically impossible. 5'
When an agency fails to meet a statutory deadline, the reviewing
court may sometimes remand the case to the agency with a new judicial deadline, pursuant to specific authority under the APA and general equitable powers to fashion adequate remedies. 52 Courts, how-

151 See 510 F.2d 692, 712 (D.C. Cir. 1975)

("First, it is possible that budgetary
commitments and manpower demands required to complete the guidelines by [the
statutory deadline] are beyond the agency's capacity or would unduly jeopardize the
implementation of other essential programs. Second, [the agency] may be unable to
conduct sufficient evaluation of available control technology to determine which is the
best practicable or may confront problems in determining the components of particular industrial discharges."). This case has generated considerable controversy and led
many courts to distinguish it. See, e.g., Envtl. Def. Fund v. Thomas, 627 F. Supp. 566,
569-70 (D.D.C. 1986) (arguing that, under Train, an agency can show that it is proceeding in good faith and not trying to "mandate flat guidelines on its own"); Sierra
Club v. Thomas, 658 F. Supp. 165, 171 n.5 (N.D. Cal. 1987) (finding that Environmental
Defense Fund v. Thomas "misconstrue[d] Train" by not requiring an agency to show
"utmost diligence"); New York v. Gorsuch, 554 F. Supp. 1060, 1065 & n.4 (S.D.N.Y.
1983) (disapproving of the susceptibility of the language in Train to expansive interpretation, and arguing that a "good faith" standard for an administrator's compliance
with a statutory mandate can only work if applied very strictly). Courts agree, however,
that the agency bears the "heavy" burden of "establishing impossibility or infeasibility
of issuing regulations within the statutory time frame." Sierra Club, 658 F. Supp. at 171.
Not surprisingly, courts are typically hesitant to find impossibility or infeasibility in the
face of clear congressional desires. See, e.g., Forest Guardians v. Babbitt, 174 F.3d 1178,
1181 (10th Cir. 1999) (rejecting an impossibility argument in the face of"a mandatory,
non-discretionary duty unambiguously imposed by the" statute); Natural Res. Def.
Council, Inc. v. U.S. EPA, 797 F. Supp. 194, 197 (E.D.N.Y. 1992) (finding that the
EPA's claim of impossibility was not "sufficient to justify a departure from a Congressional mandate"); New York, 554 F. Supp. at 1065 (arguing that recognizing an impossibility exception would grant the agency "unbridled discretion.., regardless of specific congressional directions to the contrary").
152 See Biodiversity Legal Found. v. Badgley, 309 F.3d 1166, 1177
(9th Cir. 2002)
(finding equitable relief appropriate when "an injunction is necessary to effectuate the
congressional purpose behind the statute"); In re Int'l Chem. Workers Union, 958 F.2d
1144, 1149 (D.C. Cir. 1992) ("A reviewing court 'shall compel agency action unlawfully
withheld or unreasonably delayed."' (quoting Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.
§ 706(1) (1988))). But when courts do impose judicial deadlines, they essentially create hammer provisions of their own. In Northwest EnvironmentalAdvocates v. US. EPA,
the Northern District of California gave the EPA two years to establish regulations for
ballast water discharges from vessels at American ports. No. 03-5760, 2006 WL
2669042, at *12 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 18, 2006). The court also ruled that at the end of the
two years it would vacate a rule exempting such discharges from the National Pollutant
Discharge Elimination System under the Clean Water Act. See id. at *15.
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ever, appear to exercise this authority rarely.
Courts may, of course,
utilize other options besides imposing their own deadlines on agencies. Courts often order a dilatory agency to propose a new deadline
it then promises to meet. 154 Or courts will simply declare that the
agency should act expeditiously, perhaps suggesting a target date for
completion. 5 5 In sum, courts can enforce statutory mandates, even if
those deadlines have passed, in a myriad of ways. Whether courts
elect to do so and with what frequency naturally affects the desirability
of using deadlines in statutes to control agencies.
F. OIRA Review and ConstitutionalLaw
The above deadline doctrines rest on a fundamental assumption:
that deadlines are constitutionally unproblematic. Although the use
153

In In re International Chemical Workers Union, the D.C. Circuit emphasized the

gravity of its action:
There is a point when the court must "let [an] agency know, in no uncertain terms, that enough is enough," and we believe that point has been
reached. We are not unmindful of OSHA's need to "juggle competing rulemaking demands on its limited scientific and legal staff," but we think the delay in promulgating a final rule that OSHA believes is necessary to workers'
well-being has been too lengthy for us to temporize any longer. We accept
OSHA's estimate of the additional time it needs to complete the final stages of
the rulemaking, but we insist that there be no postponement beyond the August 31, 1992 target date. Any additional delay would violate this court's order.
958 F.2d at 1150 (citations omitted) (quoting Pub. Citizen Health Research Group v.
Brock, 823 F.2d 626, 627, 629 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (per curiam)).
154See, e.g., Alaska Ctr. for the Env't v. Browner, 20 F.3d 981,
987 (9th Cir. 1994)
(holding that when agencies are derelict in their duties, "it is up to the courts in their
traditional, equitable, and interstitial role to fashion the remedy. This the district
court [by requiring the agency to set new deadlines for itself] has done in a manner we
cannot fault.").
For example, in Public Citizen Health Research Group v. Auchter, the D.C. Circuit
wrote:
Although we dictate no fixed date for issuance of a final rule, we do direct
OSHA to proceed on a priority, expedited basis and to issue a permanent
standard as promptly as possible .... Under the circumstances presented
here, i.e., the significant risk of grave danger to human life, and the time
OS1HA has already devoted to [the matter], we expect promulgation of a final
rule within a year's time.
702 F.2d 1150, 1159 (D.C. Cir. 1983). To put pressure on the agency, courts can also
retain jurisdiction over a challenge to agency inaction. See, e.g., In re Ctr. for Auto
Safety, 793 F.2d 1346, 1354 (D.C. Cir. 1986) ("[Blecause of NHTSA's history of
chronic delay and its repeated failure to meet its own projections, even in the face of a
pending lawsuit and while subject to court scrutiny, the least that this court must do is
to retain jurisdiction over this case until agency publication of the final ... standards.").
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of statutory deadlines appears to be readily accepted in law and politics, it is worth pausing to consider whether there is any plausible constitutional problem with deadlines in administrative law.
Agencies face procedural mandates not only from the APA and
other statutes, but also from an array of White House requirements.
Although statutory deadlines are typically designed to constrain
agency action, they can sometimes have the unintended consequence
of allowing agencies to subvert other requirements. A major shift in
the past twenty-five years has been renewed interest, both in scholarship and in practice, in "Presidential Administration," the assertion of
greater centralized control by the President over many aspects of administrative process.156 The President has always had nominal control
over nonindependent agencies, and some influence on independent
agencies because of the appointments power. 11 7 But starting with
President Reagan's Executive Order 12,291 in the early 1980s, and
continuing with its subsequent revisions by Presidents Clinton and
George W. Bush, Presidents have sought greater ex ante control of
proposed agency policies."" This is not the place to rehash the Presidential Administration debates; it is enough to note that the growing
influence of the OMB's Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs
(OIRA) on administrative agencies has genuine implications for the
law of deadlines.
Under Executive Order 12,866, as amended by Executive Order
13,422, nonindependent agencies must seek OMB review of legally
binding rules, typically prior to issuing notice as well as prior to
promulgating the final rule; significant guidance documents now
must also undergo OMB review.159 Although Executive Order 12,866
mandates that agencies notify the OMB of any statutory or judicial
deadlines and, "to the extent practicable, schedule rulemaking pro-

l5 See, e.g., Kagan, supra note 3, at 2246, 2290-99 (defending the Clinton administration's exercise of "directive authority" to "serve pro-regulatory objectives"); cf
Beermann, supra note 140 (discussing the phenomenon of "midnight regulation" during presidential transition periods); Seidenfeld, supra note 109 (arguing against presidential micromanagement of agency policies).
157The President appoints the leaders of independent agencies, with Senate
confirmation, but cannot remove most of them except for cause. See, e.g.,
Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 629 (1935).
158 See Kagan, supra note 3, at 2282 (arguing that
Clinton built on Reagan's legacy
to show that "presidential supervision of administration could.., trigger, not just react
to, agency action").
59 See Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Sept. 30, 1993),
amended by
Exec. Order No. 13,422, 72 Fed. Reg. 2763 (Jan. 18, 2007).
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ceedings so as to permit sufficient time for [the OMB] to conduct its
review," 160 deadlines for agency action may permit the agency to
forego that process or to ignore OMB objections.16 ' The Executive
Orders do not permit judicial review, but courts have occasionally
commanded agencies to meet their discrete mandatory obligations
even if the OMB has not approved the regulatory action." After all,
Executive Order 12,866 states that "[n]othing in this order shall be
construed as displacing
the agencies' authority or responsibilities, as
3
law."16
by
authorized
Since the Clinton administration, an increasing proportion of
agency actions must be "cleared" by OIRA. '6 The most recent Executive Order on this matter also requires that agencies consider formal
rulemaking-a notoriously slow method of policymaking-in a wider
range of contexts. 16 Agencies are also typically required to engage in
some cost-benefit justification of proposed rules and elaborate analyses for significant rules. 166 If OIRA slows the average pace of agency
action, and if Congress cares about the duration of agency processes,
then Congress might rely on deadlines to control an ever-increasing
array of regulation. In the process, statutory deadlines could undermine the prospects for effective OIRA review. The Executive Orders
establish a detailed timetable for the presentation and review of proposed agency actions; 167 meeting statutory deadlines may mean failing
to meet the President's requirements.

Exec. Order No. 12,866, § 6(a) (3) (D), 58 Fed. Reg. at 51,741.
supra note 3,at 2279 ("[T]he OMB director could cite only six instances in which agencies had issued rules over OMB's objections: in four, the agencies had acted under judicial order, and in two, the agencies successfully had appealed
their position to the White House.").
162 See Envtl. Def. Fund v. Thomas, 627 F. Supp. 566, 571 (D.D.C. 1986) ("OMB
has no authority to use its regulatory review... to delay promulgation... beyond the
date of a statutory deadline."); see also In re United Mine Workers of Am. Int'l Union,
190 F.3d 545, 551 (D.C. Cir. 1999) ("[T]he President is without authority to set aside
congressional legislation by executive order, and the 1993 executive order does not
purport to do so.").
r Exec. Order No. 12,866, § 9, 58 Fed. Reg. at 51,744.
16 See Exec. Order No. 13,422, §§ 1-3, 7, 72 Fed.
Reg, at 2763-65 (adding agency
guidance documents to the list items for review by OIRA); see also Steven Croley, White
House Review of Agency Rulemaking: An EmpiricalInvestigation, 70 U. CHI. L. REv. 821,
826-29 (2003).
16 Exec. Order No. 13,422, § 5, 72 Fed. Reg.
at 2764.
16 Exec. Order No. 12,866, § 6(a), 58 Fed. Reg. at
51,740.
167Id. § 6(b), 58 Fed. Reg. at 51,742.
160

161See Kagan,
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What if statutory timing requirements conflict with executive procedural requirements? Current law suggests that the statutory deadline takes legal priority. The relevant Executive Orders have always
contained clauses indicating that they should be applied consistently
with other legal requirements. As the relevant deadline is part of a
duly enacted statute, the OIRA timetable likely yields. Still, this area
of the law is nascent, and strong predictions are difficult. Deadlines
arguably interfere with the President's ability to implement the law
and manage executive agencies, and therefore could run afoul of
separation of powers principles. It is somewhat awkward to conclude
that a statutory deadline interferes with the President's duty under the
Take Care Clause, because the deadline is part of the law that the
President has a duty to faithfully implement. But if stringent statutory
duties in issue area X reduce the ability of the President to implement
policy in issue area Y, then perhaps Congress has impermissibly interfered with Article II authority. Even if this argument is weak, if it
raises a legitimate constitutional question, the canon of constitutional
avoidance could produce odd results. 1 8 The avoidance canon counsels that as between two interpretations, one of which raises a constitutional question and the other of which does not, a court ought to
adopt the interpretation that avoids the constitutional question.
In recent years, the President has issued a growing number of
signing statements announcing his interpretation of the statute being
signed."9 Although their legal status remains debated, suppose the
President issued a signing statement saying that he interprets a statutory deadline requiring final rules by December 31, 2010, to include

168

See Adrian Vermeule, Saving Constructions, 85 GEO. L.J. 1945, 1948-49 (1997)

(reviewing the avoidance doctrine). See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P.
Frickey, Quasi-ConstitutionalLaw: Clear Statement Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45

VAND. L. REV. 593, 599-600 (1992) (analyzing several Burger Court opinions invoking
the avoidance doctrine); Lisa A. Kloppenberg, Avoiding ConstitutionalQuestions, 35 B.C.

L. REV. 1003 (1994) (exploring the justifications and criteria for invoking the avoidance rule); Lawrence C. Marshall, Divesting the Courts: Breaking the JudicialMonopoly on

ConstitutionalInterpretation, 66 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 481, 483-92 (1990) (examining "how
well the [avoidance] canon reflects actual congressional awareness of constitutional
issues and what kind of constitutional culture it helps create within the halls of Congress"); Jerry L. Mashaw, TextualisM, Constitutionalism, and the Interpretation of Federal

Statutes, 32 WM. & MARY L. REv. 827, 838-41 (1991) (calling the avoidance canon "radically incomplete and perhaps incoherent"); Frederick Schauer, Ashwander Revisited,
1995 SuP. CT. REv. 71 (1995) (reviewing the impact ofJustice Brandeis's concurrence
in Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority on the avoidance doctrine).
169See Curtis A. Bradley & Eric A. Posner, PresidentialSigning Statements and Executive Power, 23 CONST. COMMENT. 307, 312-34 (2006).
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an implicit caveat to mean "if at all possible consistent with the requirements of OIRA review." The interpretation favored by the canon
of avoidance might well be the one proffered by the President. The
saving construction would require the new agency rule to be issued by
the deadline unless other relevant and permissible factors dictate otherwise. As noted, there is an active debate (particularly in immigration law) about whether to relax standards of judicial review under
conditions of agency strain. 7 0 Adherents of the relaxed-review school
advocate allowing agencies to ignore statutory deadlines in much the
way that the saving interpretation would in the signing statement hypothetical.
The implications might be even more significant were a proregulation Democratic Congress to face off against a strongly antiregulation Republican President. An anti-regulation President could
consistently use OIRA review to impede or block entirely new agency
regulations. Presidential bias against new regulations, however, is
hardly the only value at stake in OIRA review. More centralized presidential control and oversight over intra-agency and inter-agency regulatory agendas may produce more efficient and effective risk regulation. "' Using deadlines to obviate OIRA review is far from an
unqualified good. Nor is congressional interference with the OIRA
Executive Orders far-fetched. Various legislators in the current Congress have sought to counter changes to OIRA review. A provision in
the House appropriations legislation, adopted by the chamber, contained a clause forbidding the White House from expending any
funds to implement the latest Executive Order on regulatory review. 172
As the White House seeks to ratchet up control of administrative
agencies, congressional countermoves grow ever more likely.
G. Summary
We have surveyed many instances of deadline doctrines in administrative law. First, under the rubric of reviewability, the existence of a
statutory deadline often makes judicial review of agency inaction more
likely. Second, the presence of a deadline increases the probability
that agencies will successfully avoid notice and comment procedural

170

:71

72

See Pierce, supranote 7, at 85-89.
See generally Bagley & Revesz, supra note 3.
See H.R 2829, 110th Cong. § 901 (2007) ("None of the funds made available by

this Act may be used to implement Executive Order 13422."). The Senate also considered similar language, but ultimately did not include the defunding provision.
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requirements pursuant to the "good cause" exception in the APA.
Third, deadlines have two important effects, both of which reduce the
odds that an agency will receive judicial deference. At Chevron Step
Zero, the failure to use formal procedures may lower the probability
of judicial deference.1 3 But if courts treat deadline actions as legislative rules, agencies could receive deference for informal judgments
more often. At Step One, an explicit deadline is less likely to generate
statutory ambiguity about timing requirements for agency actions.
Fourth, deadlines have ambiguous effects on arbitrary and capricious
challenges. When agencies sacrifice deliberative process to meet
deadlines, the odds that existing decisions will fail to meet the State
Farm factors grow. If judges apply relaxed standards of review (as
some judges do), agency actions may be more likely (or as likely) to
survive arbitrary and capricious challenges. Together, these deadline
doctrines likely do more harm than good in administrative law, or so
we now suggest.

TV. NORMATIVE IMPLICATIONS
Before continuing, a brief caveat is in order. Sometimes it is more
important that a rule exist than that it be right. When a rule serves
only as a coordination mechanism, its actual content is arbitrary. For
this subset of regulatory action, quicker action is almost always better
because there cannot, by construction, be a sacrifice of content, quality, or process. The vast majority of regulations are not of this sort.
When there is a right answer (or a better answer), congressional use
of deadlines may be suboptimal. As noted, deadlines can increase the
probability of judicial review for certain forms of agency inaction,
make it easier for agencies to emerge victorious against procedural
challenges to the failure to utilize notice and comment, make it more
difficult for agencies to defend substantive challenges in the Chevron
framework, and make it harder to defeat arbitrary and capricious challenges if judges do not relax the ordinary standards of review. How
then are agencies likely to respond to deadlines?
First, some portion of the underlying distribution of actions that
would likely have been promulgated using notice and comment pro-

173 See Matthew C. Stephenson, The Strategic Substitution Effect: Textual Plausibility,

Procedural Formality, and Judicial Review of Agency Statutoy Interpretations, 120 HARv. L.
REv. 528, 533-34 (2006); see also Barnhart v. Walton, 537 U.S. 212, 221-22 (2002) (reviewing prior decisions on the relevance of rulemaking formality to the Step Zero determination).
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cedures may be issued using less formal mechanisms. Because deadlines often constitute "good cause" for avoiding notice and comment
and because the ordinary costliness of notice and comment is exacerbated under time constraints, agencies can be expected to opt out of
these costly procedures more often. Both democratic and technocratic ideals in administrative law suggest that notice and comment is
a desirable form of agency action.174 On this view, deadlines should
make administrative behavior worse. Fewer agency decisions will take
advantage of the information and expertise produced by notice and
comment; fewer decisions will exhibit the democratic legitimacy produced by public participation.
A second, related effect derives from the Mead doctrine. Ordinarily, Mead provides a counterweight to agencies considering informal
decision-making mechanisms.'
Because procedural formality usually
allows an agency to qualify for Chevron deference, I agencies that want
deference in litigation tend toward such formality, notwithstanding
the costs. 177 Certain deadline doctrines undermine this incentive. Because statutory deadlines can connote congressional clarity under
Step One of Chevron, the probability that judicial deference will be
given to some agency views is marginally lower. With lower benefits
from notice and comment procedures at Step One, deadlines may
weaken an agency's motivation to use those procedures for Step Zero.
Some courts treat deadline actions not promulgated using notice
and comment as "good cause" actions. If Step Zero allows deference
in these scenarios, the temptation to avoid notice and comment and
still receive Chevron deference will be all the greater. Although we do
not want to romanticize informal rulemaking, the dominant trend in
the courts and commentary has clearly been toward more notice and

,74See generally Cu~llar, supra note 69 (arguing that comment by the lay public
serves an important function in regulatory democracy).
175 See

generally M. Elizabeth Magill, Agency Choice of PolicymakingForm, 71 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1383, 1431 (2004) ("(Mead] structures scope-of-review doctrine systematically by

telling all agencies that there is a link between the policymaking form chosen and the
standard of review applied.").
176 Cf Barnhart,537 U.S. at 221 ("[T)he fact that the Agency previously reached
its
interpretation through means less formal than 'notice and comment' rulemaking does
not automatically deprive that interpretation of the judicial deference otherwise its
due." (citation omitted)).
177 This obviates many underlying complexities. See Stephenson,
supra note 173, at
533 (arguing that the increased latitude that accompanies greater procedural formality
will lead to less textually plausible agency interpretations of statutes).
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comment rather than less. Deadline doctrines are then a consequential exception to this general rule.
Third, arbitrary and capricious review requires that agencies consider all required factors, not consider any precluded factors, and
clearly explain the link between the evidence in the record and the
ultimate policy choice.17 8 Although the arbitrary and capricious doctrine does not demand procedural formality, some degree of formality
is often required implicitly. If courts do not give agencies greater leeway because of the deadline, then agencies will be more likely to lose
arbitrary and capricious challenges. If agencies do not have sufficient
time to adequately consider and evaluate relevant factors or evidence,
all else equal, decisions are more likely to be overturned. Ifjudges do
give agencies more leeway when deadlines are present, agencies will

not lose in litigation, but greater uncertainty and instability in administrative law will be generated because of exceptions to long-standing
doctrine.
Neither of these alternatives is especially desirable. The first results in lower-quality agency actions that are more likely to be struck
down, creating more administrative delay rather than less. The second carves out an ad hoc exception to standard administrative law requirements. Although others suggest such an exception would be desirable," 9 we are not quite convinced. Ifjudges are less likely to strike
down deadline actions on arbitrary and capricious grounds, it is at
least relevant that an important check on agency behavior is weakened. These assorted deadline doctrines can shift agency decisions
out of notice and comment, increase delay in the ultimate implementation of rules, and cause greater confusion and uncertainty in administrative law.
It is also the case that deadlines shift internal agency resources
away from policy programs without deadlines toward policy programs
with deadlines.'80 Many strains of administrative law seek to preserve
the agency's ability to allocate internal resources."' Agency decisions
not to enforce or adjudicate are defended on this ground; the extraordinary deference given to agency decisions not to act and the
178

Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of the U.S. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463

U.S. 29,43 (1983).
179 See Pierce, supra note 7, at
85-89.

IS0Abbott, Cost-Benefit Appraisal, supra note 7, at 192-95; Pierce, supra note 7, at 80-81.
For arguments that judicial review in general leads to resource reallocation, see Biber,
supra note 7, and Cross, supra note 41, at 1036-39.
181 See, e.g., Abbott, Cost-Benefit Appraisal,
supra note 7, at 192-95.
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presumption against reviewability of certain agency inactions generally
are as well. Each is founded, in part, on the idea that agencies are
better than courts at managing their own internal affairs.
Setting aside concerns about the internal coherence of administrative law, to evaluate the normative status of deadlines, one must
know whether the existing allocation of agency resources is desirable;
whether relative institutional capacities suggest that Congress, agencies, or courts should make decisions about agency resources; and if
the existing allocation is not desirable and if Congress is an appropriate institutional decision maker, whether statutory deadlines are a reasonable mechanism for change.
To explore these issues, consider the use of deadlines in risk regulation. The existing literature provides several reasons to be skeptical.
First, there is a general tendency to favor new, high-profile risks for
regulation over older, more familiar risks that may be more serious.""
This new-risk bias produces an inefficient allocation of resources because older, more serious risks are not given their appropriate share
of time, money, and attention.
If deadlines accompany statutory
commands to address newly recognized risks (as they often do), then
deadlines will tend to exacerbate the new-risk bias rather than mitigate it. In a world of limited agency resources, a statutory command
to formulate regulations in a new policy area will inevitably reduce resources allocated to other areas unless accompanied by a corresponding increase in budget.1 4 Absent a deadline, an agency can at least allocate resources according to need and importance across programs
over time. The deadline removes one dimension of flexibility, and
therefore likely worsens the misallocation problem from new-risk bias.
Still, to know whether deadlines are good or bad for social welfare, political accountability, regulatory policy, or administrative law,

182

See, e.g., Timur Kuran & Cass R. Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk Regula-

tion, 51 STAN. L. REv. 683, 715-36 (1999); Roger G. Noll &James E. Krier, Some Implications of Cognitive Psychologyfor Risk Regulation, 19J. LEGAL STUD. 747, 754-55 (1990);Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Cynthia R. Farina, Cognitive Psychology and Optimal Government
Design, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 549, 556 (2002); Mark Seidenfeld, Cognitive Loafing Social
Conformity, and Judicial Review of Agency Rulemaking, 87 CORNELL L. REv. 486, 501-02
(2002).
183 SeeBREYER, supra note 17, at 33 (giving the
example that "[r]isks associated with
toxic waste dumps and nuclear power appear near the bottom of most expert lists; they
appear near the top of the public's list of concerns, which more directly influences
regulatory agendas").
184 See Pierce, supra note 7, at 65-70; see also Abbott,
Cost-Benefit Appraisal,supra note
7, at 192-95 (discussing the costs of this forced reallocation of resources).
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one cannot only compare the best-case scenario for a lack of deadlines
with the worst-case scenario for deadline-driven action. Absent the
deadline, one possibility is that the agency would have spent the appropriate amount of time and resources to select the optimal regulatory regime. Another, and the one raised by the theoretical sketch in
Part I, is that the agency would have taken too long to do the wrong
thing. Yet another possibility is that the agency would have done
nothing. If a statutory deadline shifts outcomes from either of these
latter two outcomes,
then deadlines could easily make the regulatory
5
11
better.
world
Assume, then, that the existing allocation of agency resources is
incorrect. Are congressional deadlines a reasonable way to calibrate?
Congress regularly makes decisions about agency resources. Congress
specifies an agency's budget; Congress creates, removes, or expands
agency jurisdiction; and Congress mandates or forbids that agencies
address certain policy problems. So long as these other forms of resource allocation are uncontroversial, it is hard to see why comparative institutional competence arguments demand that Congress avoid
deadlines.
That said, there is something awkward about a legislature not only
making judgments about the internal allocation of agency resources
but doing so indirectly using deadlines, rather than directly using
budgeting authority or clear statutory commands.116 A remaining
question is whether deadlines are an objectionable mechanism for allocating agency resources even if there are no good grounds for objecting to congressional reallocation of agency resources in general.
One such concern might be that the reallocation is transient. Prior to
the deadline, resources must be reallocated, but after the deadline,
the agency could revert to the old allocation, which (by working assumption) is incorrect.
Alternatively, the use of congressional deadlines to shift resources
is troubling if a common byproduct is to lower the quality of regulatory decisions. Tentative theoretical and empirical evidence suggests
this may be the case.18 If deadline outcomes are worse than nondead-

185 One might also want to compare different forms of deadline
regimes (e.g.,
statutory deadlines,judicial deadlines, deadlines with escape clauses, etc.).
186 Cf Biber, supra note 7, at 36 (stating that the legislature, not the agency,
should
be responsible if the legislature will not provide the funds to implement the duties it
prescribes).
187 See, e.g., Carpenter et al., supra note 20,
at 21-23 (finding that deadlines may
result in the approval of less-safe pharmaceuticals).
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line outcomes, deadline actions will be struck down more often by
courts, which will produce more delay and arguably a greater displacement of agency resources than Congress originally intended
(unless Congress anticipates this effect and incorporates the eventuality into its timing decision). Even if the actual shift in resources is desirable, deadlines may not produce the desired effects or, at least, may
also produce undesired effects, a conclusion emphasized both by theory and data. s
The simple point is that there are risks as well as benefits from
statutory deadlines. This is true for social welfare; it is true for political accountability.8 9 Deadlines sometimes ensure that important policy is generated and implemented quickly, effectively, and efficiently.
But deadlines can also produce a range of negative side effects, distorting agency procedures and reducing the quality of decisions. If
deadlines do reduce the quality of agency actions, then actions will be
prompt but not of high quality. If courts strike down the low-quality
actions, then ultimate agency policy will be of reasonable quality, but
not timely. If Congress generally prefers agency decision-making
processes that allow for public input, the development of expertise,
and reasoned deliberation, none of these goals is necessarily served
well by deadlines. Deadlines are therefore unlikely to be a cure-all for
remedying the pathologies of regulatory policy, notwithstanding the
sensible reasons for regulating the timing of agency action.
If effective, deadlines may be democratically desirable, reducing
agency shirking and increasing congressional monitoring. Deadlines
can, however, also serve political interests in a narrower, partisan
sense. If deadlines are used as a mechanism for controlling agency
problems, then they should be used more often when agencies have
preferences further from those of the legislature. More deadlines
should be enacted during periods of divided government. Congress
should also more frequently impose deadlines on agencies that are
perceived to be further from legislative ideal points.
On the other hand, it is possible that deadlines, by functioning as credible
commitment devices, give agencies more authority (at least relative to the OMB and
interest groups) and help agencies make better decisions. Cf Magill, supra note 7, at
188

152, 183-84 (proposing that pressure on agencies to act quickly might diminish the potential of interested parties to influence the agency); supra note 41.

189 See Abbott, Cost-Benefit Appraisal,supra note 7. There are also costs
and benefits
to various institutions, which often may not align with social welfare or political accountability objectives. For instance, deadlines have tailored consequences for Congress, the White House, agencies, and the courts. These consequences raise interesting positive questions, some of which were discussed in Part I.
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In part, these are empirical predictions, but they have normative
implications as well. Deadlines imposed in particular political or institutional configurations may result in less effective regulatory policy. If
less-centralized regulatory policy in the executive branch causes fewer
systematic inter-agency and inter-risk tradeoffs, then deadlines are
likely to produce worse net policy. But deadlines may also create
more effective policy if they are imposed on agencies that would otherwise do very little to improve social welfare under strong executive
control. In other words, there may be less coordination and fewer
inter-risk tradeoffs with more deadlines, but there may be more socially beneficial regulatory policy overall because agencies acting on
their own are forced to enact beneficial regulations that they would
not otherwise implement without deadlines. Again, the proper comparison should not presume coordinated executive control at its best.
Given a particular political configuration, the costs to weakened coordination from deadlines must be weighed against the benefits to regulatory outputs that would not occur but for deadlines, or that would
occur much more slowly.
Ironically, even if deadlines improve social welfare, they may undermine democratic accountability in another important sense. To
the extent that the President is more representative of the national
electorate, a deregulatory administration whose agencies do very little
may comport better with voter preferences than a congressional
committee with preferences different than the congressional median
that imposes deadlines to force particular regulatory actions. To the
extent, however, that Congress is more representative,1 9° deadlines
may promote greater political accountability.
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE RESEARCH

Before concluding, a handful of potential future research questions that follow from the findings are worth noting. Deadlines likely
force agencies to reallocate resources away from programs without
deadlines and toward programs with deadlines. If the resourceallocation hypothesis is correct, then deadlines for one policy should
produce an increase in the expected duration of agency actions in

190 Seejide

Nzelibe, The Fable of the Nationalist Presidentand the ParochialCongress, 53

UCLA L. REv. 1217, 1221 (2006) ("[Olne could surmise that... the narrow and parochial interests of individual legislators are likely to cancel each other out and produce
a potential outcome that is much more representative of the national interest than that
of any single political actor.").
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other policy areas that the agency implements. Alternatively, if deadlines lower the quality of average agency decisions, 9' then it should be
the case that actions with deadlines are more likely to be struck down
in postenactment legal challenges than agency actions that are not
subject to deadlines. Assuming that the quality of agency decision
making is positively correlated with courts sustaining agency action,
then agency rules of lower quality should, all else equal, be more likely
to be overturned. Nevertheless, deadlines may also signal clear congressional intent, making courts more likely to remand without vacatur in these cases.
We leave these issues for another day. For now, we hope to have
shown that deadlines are a central and poorly understood feature of
the modern administrative state. If delay is a preferred method of
agency shirking, then regulating the timing of agency decisions is a
natural response. Indeed, deadlines often do quicken agency action,
at least to some degree, but they also produce policy resulting from
systematically different decision-making processes that are less intensive than the norm. Deadlines seem to trade timing against process,
and possibly even quality. When deadline actions get to court, judges
apply doctrines that run counter to many existing strands of administrative law, either undermining desirable incentives for agency behavior or making it more likely that subpar agency decisions will be given
legal effect. Deadlines are not uniformly undesirable, of course, but
nor are they a panacea for the problem of regulatory delay. The theoretical, empirical, doctrinal, and normative analysis here emphasizes
the importance of deadlines not only for administrative law, but also
for institutional design and democratic theory more generally.

191

See supra note 187 and accompanying text.
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TABLES AND FIGURES

Table 1: Deadlines by Year

Year

Statutory

judicial

Total

Percent
Statutory

Percent
Judicial

1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003

53
121
178
118
279
282
237
194
178
152
195
114
94
240
113
93
86

1
9
21
15
17
16
35
70
89
69
74
80
57
77
88
63
63

54
130
199
133
296
298
272
264
267
221
269
194
151
317
201
156
149

98.15
93.08
89.45
88.72
94.26
94.63
87.13
73.48
66.67
68.78
72.49
58.76
62.25
75.71
56.22
59.62
57.72

1.85
6.92
10.55
11.28
5.74
5.37
12.87
26.52
33.33
31.22
27.51
41.24
37.75
24.29
43.78
40.38
42.28

Data: Total number ofjudicial and statutory deadlines reported with actual dates
by all agencies, by year of deadline date. Source: Unified Agenda reports, Oct.
1988-Oct. 2003. Duplicate RIN entries were handled as follows: if there was no
deadline reported, the most recent Unfied Agenda entry was kept for each RIN; if
there was a deadline reported, however, the most recent Unified Agenda entry was
retained out of all entries with the same RIN and deadline information (deadline
type, deadline stage, and deadline date).
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Figure 1: Statutory and Judicial Deadlines, 1987-2003

1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
1

Statutory Ujudicial

Data: Total number of'judicial and statutory deadlines reported with actual dates
by all agencies, by year of deadline date. Source: Unified Agenda reports, Oct.
1988-Oct. 2003. Duplicate RIN entries were handled as follows: if there was no
deadline reported, the most recent Unified Agenda entry was retained for each
RIN; if there was a deadline reported, however, the most recent Unified Agenda
entry was retained out of all entries with the same RIN and deadline information
(deadline type, deadline stage, and deadline date).
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Table 2: Deadlines by Agency
Agency
Consumer Product Safety Commission
Department of Agriculture
Department of Commerce
Department of Defense
Department of Education
Department of Energy
Department of Health and Human Services
Department of Housing and Urban Development
Department of the Interior
Department ofJustice
Department of Labor
Department of State
Department of Transportation
Department of the Treasury
Department of Veterans Affairs
Environmental Protection Agency
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
Federal Communications Commission
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
Federal Emergency Management Agency
Federal Maritime Commission
Federal Reserve System
Federal Trade Commission
General Services Administration
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Office of Management and Budget
Office of Personnel Management
Securities and Exchange Commission
Small Business Administration

Statutory Judicial
8
350
940
203
12
63
323
107
279
90
75
30
350
141
13
611
5
37
37
11
11
29
10
29
10
3
4
41
25
31

0
3
22
0
0
0
12
2
209
3
6
0
9
3
1
731
0
2
0
0
0
0
1
2
0
0
0
0
0
0

Total
8
353
962
203
12
63
335
109
488
93
81
30
359
144
14
1342
5
39
37
11
11
29
11
31
10
3
4
41
25
31

Data: Total number ofjudicial and statutory deadlines reported by agencies, with
and without actual dates. Source: Unified Agenda reports, Oct. 1988-Oct. 2003.
Duplicate RIN entries were handled as follows: if there was no deadline reported,
the most recent Unified Agenda entry was retained for each RIN; if there was a
deadline reported, however, the most recent Unified Agenda entry was retained out
of all entries with the same RIN and deadline information (deadline type,
deadline stage, and deadline date).
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Figure 2: Deadlines over Time for Four Major Agencies

1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003

-

USDA
HHS

-_--

- EPA
DOT

Data: Number of statutory deadlines reported with actual dates by USDA, EPA,
HHS, and DOT, by year of deadline date. Source: Unified Agenda reports, Oct.
1988-Oct. 2003. Duplicate RIN entries were handled as follows: if there was no
deadline reported, the most recent Unified Agenda entry was retained for each
RIN; if there was a deadline reported, however, the most recent Unified Agenda
entry was retained out of all entries with the same RIN and deadline information
(deadline type, deadline stage, and deadline date).
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Table 3: Simple Correlation of Judicial and Statutory Deadlines
Correlation
Coefficient

p-value

n

Pearson

0.042

< 0.0001

32,712

Kendall's Tau B

0.049

< 0.0001

32,712

Spearman's Rho

0.049

< 0.0001

32,712

Data:
Correlation between the number of statutory deadlines and judicial
deadlines reported, with and without actual dates, by RIN, using a one-tailed
significance test. Source: Unified Agenda reports, Apr. 1988-Oct. 2003. The most
recent entry for a RIN was retained; earlier entries were deleted.

Table 4: Categorical Association of Statutory and Judicial Deadlines
Type of Deadline
Statutory Deadlines Only
Judicial Deadlines Only
Statutory and Judicial Deadlines
No Deadlines

n
2493
331
81
29,807

Data: Number of RINs reporting statutory deadlines only, judicial deadlines only,
both statutory and judicial deadlines, and no deadlines, with and without actual
dates. Source: Unified Agenda reports, Apr. 1988-Oct. 2003. The most recent
entry for a RIN was retained; earlier entries were deleted.
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Table 5: Significant Rules and Deadlines

Significant Rules
Nonsignificant Rules
Percent Significant

Any
Deadline

Statutory
Deadline

No
Deadline

620
1217
33.75%

487
1073
31.22%

3716
14,969
19.89%

Data: Number of RINs (stratified by whether the RIN was significant or
nonsignificant) reporting any deadline, any statutory deadline, and no deadline,
with and without actual dates. Source: Unified Agenda reports, Apr. 1995-Oct.
2003. The most recent entry for a RIN was retained; earlier entries were deleted.

Table 6: Simple Correlation of Significant Regulatory Action and
Presence of Any Deadline

Pearson
Kendall's Tau B
Spearman's Rho

Correlation
Coefficient

p-value

n

0.097
0.097
0.097

< 0.0001
< 0.0001
< 0.0001

20,522
20,522
20,522

Data: Correlation between significance of regulatory action and presence of any
deadline, reported with or without actual dates, by RIN, using a two-tailed significance test. Source: Unified Agenda reports, Apr. 1995-Oct. 2003. The most recent entry for a RIN was retained; earlier entries were deleted.
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Table 7: Simple Correlations of Regulation Type and
Presence of Any Deadline
Regulatory
Characteristic

Correlation
Coefficient

p-value

n

Unfunded Government Mandate

0.042

< 0.0001

20,522

Unfunded Private Mandate

0.088

< 0.0001

20,522

State Government

0.127

< 0.0001

32,712

Local Government

0.089

< 0.0001

32,712

Tribal Government

0.046

< 0.0001

32,712

Federal Government

0.118

< 0.0001

32,712

Data: Correlation between particular regulatory characteristics and any deadlines
reported, with and without actual dates, by RIN; identical correlation coefficients
are obtained for Pearson, Kendall's Tau B, and Spearman's Rho in a two-tailed
significance test. Source: For unfunded mandates, Unified Agenda reports, Apr.
1995-Oct. 2003 (reporting on unfunded mandates started in the mid-1990s). For
the other characteristics, Unified Agenda reports, Apr. 1988-Oct. 2003. For all, the
most recent entry for a RIN was retained; earlier entries were deleted.
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Table 8: Agency Decision Process and Deadlines
Any
Deadline
Interim Rules

Statutory
Deadline

No
Deadline

360

356

2283

No Interim Rules
Percent Interim Rules

2545
12.39%

2218
13.83%

27,524
7.66%

Direct Rules
No Direct Rules
Percent Direct Rules

6
2899
0.21%

5
2569
0.19%

231
29,576
0.77%

Data: Number of RINs reporting any deadline, any statutory deadline, and no
deadline, with and without actual dates, stratified by whether the RIN had an
interim final rule or not (or a direct final rule or not). Source: Unified Agenda
reports, Apr. 1988-Oct. 2003. The most recent entry for a RIN was retained;
earlier entries were deleted.

Table 9: Simple Correlations of Agency Decision Process and
Presence of Any Deadline

Pearson
Interim Rules

Direct Rules

Kendall's
Tau B

Spearman's
Rho

0.042

0.049

0.049

(p < 0.0001)

(p < 0.0001)

(p< 0.0001)

n = 32,712
-0.019
(p < 0.001)
n = 32,712

n= 32,712
-0.019
(p< 0.001)
n = 32,712

n = 32,712
-0.019
(p < 0.001)
n = 32,712

Data: Correlation between type of rulemaking (direct final rule or interim final
rule) and presence of any deadline, with and without an actual date, by RIN,
using a two-tailed significance test. Source: Unified Agenda reports, Apr. 1988Oct. 2003. The most recent entry for a RIN was retained; earlier entries were
deleted.
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Table 10: Simple Correlation of Number of Comment Periods and
Presence of Any Deadline

Pearson
Kendall's Tau B
Spearman's Rho

Correlation
uoencient

p-value

n

0.050
0.043
0.043

< 0.0001
< 0.0001
< 0.0001

32,712
32,712
32,712

Data: Correlation between the number of comment periods (count goes up by 1
for a new comment period, a reopened comment period, or an extended
comment period) and any deadline reported, with and without actual dates, by
RIN, using a two-tailed significance test. Source: Unified Agenda reports, Apr.
1988-Oct. 2003. The most recent entry for a RIN was retained; earlier entries
were deleted.

988

UNIVERSITY OFPENNSYLVANIA LA WREVEW

[Vol. 156: 923

Table 11: Simple Correlations of Duration with
Regulatory Significance and Presence of Any Deadline

SRgaofiry
igniicance
Deadline
Present

Pearson

Kendall's
Tau B

Spearman's
Rho

0.060
(P < 0.0001)

0.068
(p < 0.0001)

0.083
(p < 0.0001)

n = 6040

n = 6040

n = 6040

-0.056

-0.052

-0.064

(p< 0.0001)
n= 6040

(p< 0.0001)
n = 6040

(P< 0.0001)
n= 6040

Data: Correlation between significance of regulatory action and duration (first
row) and between the presence of any deadline, with and without an actual date,
and duration (second row), by RIN, using a two-tailed significance test. Source:
Unfied Agenda reports, Apr. 1995-Oct. 2003, using only RINs with an NPRM with
an actual date and a final action (i.e., rule, action, interim final rule, or direct
final rule) with an actual date. The most recent entry for a RIN was retained;
earlier entries were deleted.

Table 12: Average Duration of Agency Action

Mean

Nondeadline Actions
95% CI

USDA
EPA

400.63
685.07

369.52-431.74
625.55-744.60

HI-IS
DOT

817.07
586.12

761.23-872.91
545.18-627.06

Mean

Deadline Actions
95% CI

697
462

375.71
610.54

296.26-455.16
542.29-678.78

113
279

710
1085

444.68
440.29

360.06-529.31
381.93-498.65

82
146

Data: Mean duration of completed agency actions for the USDA, EPA, HHS, and
DOT. Source: Unified Agenda reports, Apr. 1988-Oct. 2003, using only RINs with
an NPRM with an actual date and a final action (i.e., rule, action, interim final
rule, or direct final rule) with an actual date. The most recent entry for a RIN was
retained; earlier entries were deleted.
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Table 13: Estimates of Duration of Rulemakings
CPH (1995+)
Coefficient

(SE clustered
on RIN)

Covariate

Deadline
Regulatory Significance
Comment Periods
NPRM in United Government
Congressional Change
Presidential Change
Carter
Carter
Reagan
Bush 41
Bush 43
Deadline*Withdrawal (W)
Regulatory Significance*W
Comment Periods*W
NPRM in United Government*W
Congressional Change*W
Presidential Change*W
Carter*W
Reagan*W
Bush 41*W
Bush 43*W
Observations
WaldX 2

0.318
-0.277
-0.056
-0.087
-1.026
-2.024
-1.322
-0.640
0.033
-0.077

(0.047)**
(0.039)**
(0.027)*
(0.035)*
(0.039)**
(0.062)**
(0.312)**
(0.099)**
(0.075)
(0.039)*

-0.136 (0.134)
0.071 (0.078)
-0.149
-0.175
0.466
1.138

(0.061)*
(0.107)
(0.121)**
(0.118)**

(0.325)
(0.127)**
(0.110)**
(0.171)**
17,922
(2 per RIN for
competing risks)
6355.07 (97)
P< 0.0001
-0.159
-0.509
-0.412
0.895

CPH (1988+)
Coefficient
(SE clustered
on RIN)

0.301 (0.037)**
-0.020
0.279
-1.718
-1.392
-0.778
0.248
0.018
0.098

(0.023)
(0.030)**
(0.029)**
(0.030)**
(0.170)**
(0.032)**
(0.029)
(0.038)**

-0.155 (0.106)
-0.209 (0.051)**
-0.248 (0.080)**
0.800 (0.059)**
0.582 (0.065)**
0.006
-0.614
-0.200
0.816

(0.190)
(0.069)**
(0.068)**
(0.150)**

29,732
(2 per RIN for
competing risks)
10569.25 (100)
p < 0.0001

p < 0.01, * p < 0.05. Covariates included in both CPH models but not significant: State Government, Local Government, Federal Government, Tribal Government, State Government*Withdrawal, Local Government*Withdrawal, Federal
Government*Withdrawal, and Tribal Government*Withdrawal. Covariates for all
agencies in the database (and their interactions with withdrawal actions) were also
included in both models.
**
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The following major agencies had a significantly positive effect on duration (i.e., a
negative effect on the hazard rate) in both models: Departments of Agriculture,
Energy, Health and Human Services, the Interior, Justice, Labor, the Treasury,
and Transportation; Environmental Protection Agency; and Federal Communications Commission. The following major agencies had a significantly negative effect on duration (i.e., a positive effect on the hazard rate) in both models: Department of Commerce, Department of Education, and Small Business
Administration. The Unified Agenda reports used here (1995 and later for Model
1 and 1988 and later for Model 2) contain some information on much earlier actions, permitting the inclusion of dummy variables for Presidents Carter, Reagan,
and George H.W. Bush in both models.

